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1. INTRODUCTION 
The creative industry refers to a range of economic activities that is both knowledge 
intensive and labor intensive, particularly those requiring high concentrations of creative 
input and concerned with the generation or exploitation of knowledge and information 
(Howkins, 2001). 
The creative industry provides nations with a two-fold benefit. First, the creative 
industry contributes significantly to the GDP of many nations. In Australia, the creative 
industry contributes more than $90 billion to the economy annually, including over $45 
billion in annual GDP and $3.2 billion in annual exports (Creative Industries Innovation 
Centre, 2013). Second, and quite uniquely, the creative industry provides nations with 
intangible benefits, such as the ability to spread soft power, boost national confidence, and 
acquire expertise in diverse areas such as the arts, entertainment, and technology. This thesis 
explores the impact of the ownership on user innovation, content performance and strategic 
intent in the global creative industry in three separate articles. 
At its core, the creative industry encompasses many sub-industries and can be 
distinguished from other industries in that creativity is used as a medium for value creation. 
While all industries exhibit creative tendencies to some extent, the creative industry differs by 
the fact that creativity is at the core of the value-creation process. Nesta (2013) built a 
framework for defining creative occupations by their level of creative intensity. The criteria 
for assessment under the framework include five key components:  
1. Novel process – does the role most commonly solve a problem in a novel way? 
2. Mechanization resistant – the use of specialized labor within the creative industry 
shows that the creative labor force contributes something with no mechanical 
substitute. 
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3. Non-repetitiveness or non-uniform function – is the product likely to vary each time it 
is created due to the interplay of factors, skills, creative impulses, and learning? 
4. Creative contribution to the value chain – is the outcome novel or creative irrespective 
of the context in which it is produced? 
5. Interpretation, not mere transformation – does the role do more than merely shift the 
service or artefact’s form or place or time? 
Businesses operating within the creative industry are extremely varied (Peltoniemi, 
2015); however, using Nesta’s framework, I can categorize businesses operating in the 
creative industry into seven sub-industries. These include, 1) music and performing arts; 2) 
film, television, and radio; 3) advertising and marketing; 4) software and interactive content; 
5) writing, publishing, and print media; 6) architecture; and 7) design and visual arts.  
At the micro level, tensions exist between business and creativity (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Artistic and economic logics operating within the same environment find it difficult to 
achieve equilibrium (Eikhof and Haunschild, 2007; Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005). At the 
macro level, I find tensions between user-innovators and the platforms, firms, and 
governments. This thesis focuses on these macro-level tensions.  
This thesis is with publication encompassing three unique articles examining 
ownership-to-performance links within the global creative industry. Each chapter explores a 
different ownership theme within the creative industry. The research questions I seek to 
answer in this thesis are as follow: 
1) In Chapter 2, I explore how ownership in the virtual-world affects long-term user 
innovation success. 
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2) In Chapter 3, I determine the performance outcomes of bringing new films to market 
through a channel which includes owned cinemas (vertically integrated) versus a 
channel with only independent cinemas (non-integrated). 
3) Finally, in Chapter 4, I answer whether the strategic-intent of transnational ownership 
of Western cinema assets by Chinese companies are made with business intent or 
political intent. 
Ownership is a broad concept and can have many meanings within the creative 
industry context. Ownership can be described as a status or situation that confers on a person 
the greatest range of rights over certain owned property (Gaus, 2012). In addition, ownership 
is the determination of various rights and duties over certain properties (Bergström, 1999). 
The proliferation of new technology means that ownership is evolving. Various studies have 
examined ownership-to-performance links (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1998; Levitt and Syverson, 2005; De Zwart, 2010). However, these studies show that 
performance outcomes that stem from ownership are not conclusive. Some studies show 
positive effects on performance while others show negative effects on performance 
(Bergström, 1999; Eisenberg, 1999; Baker et al., 2002; Crabb, 2005). What I find from these 
studies is that the ownership-to-performance benefits are heavily dependent on how 
ownership and performance is defined and measured. Within the creative industry context, 
ownership has multiple dimensions. For example, ownership can cross into another 
dimension in the form of virtual worlds. In addition, ownership of value chains in film can 
allow narratives to be spread beyond national borders and extend a nation’s global influence. 
All these exciting advances in technology and innovation are happening within the creative 
industry with ownership as a binding theme.  
This thesis therefore examines ownership in the creative industry given the industry’s 
rapid growth and rising importance as a driver of the global economy in the twenty-first 
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century. The creative industry is also one of the few industries which can affect people’s 
views and thus can impact state institutions. 
1.1 Main Theoretical Themes Regarding Ownership in the Creative Industry 
A major theme in this thesis is ownership. Different ownership themes are presented 
in the three papers from unique perspectives within the global creative industry. These 
include: 1) ownership in the virtual-world, 2) ownership of the value chain in film making, 
and 3) ownership of strategic foreign cinema assets.  
The normative concept of ownership is generally universally understood. Ordinarily, 
ownership is a tool used by governments, businesses, and individuals to increase wealth and 
overall financial performance. In business, ownership spans across all industries, sectors, and 
geographies and is employed by both large and small firms alike. Ownership in the creative 
industry both exhibits these standard ownership traits and goes further in providing tangible 
and intangible benefits for the owner. In the creative industry, one can extract tangible 
financial gain from intangible assets such as ownership in the virtual-world. Likewise, 
intangible benefits can be extracted from tangible assets, as in the case of foreign 
acquisitions. Thus, it can be theorized that the concept of ownership as it applies to the 
creative industry is complex and poorly understood. 
The first theme in this thesis is ownership in the virtual-world. Ownership is an 
essential motivator of sustained and ongoing user-innovation. Owning something often 
involves giving consideration to an item that result in the transfer of rights to the purchaser, 
who can then deal with the purchased item. This preconceived notion of ownership cannot 
apply equally in the virtual-world because the rights ordinarily attached to such transactions 
are not apparent (Burk, 2016). It is often not clear what type of right is attached to virtual-
world purchases – whether it is a license to use or ownership of an asset (albeit a virtual 
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asset). One major obstacle inhibiting the growth of virtual ownership surrounds the question 
of how to extract virtual assets. Ordinarily, virtual users can convert virtual assets into real-
world money through an exchange system. However, in cases where a platform shuts down a 
user’s accounts, the inability to extract assets becomes a significant source of tension between 
content owners and the platform.  
The second theme in this thesis is ownership of the value chain in film making. That 
is, it concerns whether ownership of the value chain affects a film’s financial performance. 
This question dates back to Berle and Means (1932), who first posited that the separation of 
ownership reduces management incentive to maximize corporate efficiency. This was 
subsequently refined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) into the theory of the corporate 
ownership structure, which is better known as “agency theory”. The central tenants of agency 
theory concern the alignment of varying interests through ownership. While the link between 
ownership and performance has been examined to some depth, mostly in the context of 
ownership’s effect on firm share price, few studies have been done on the topic in the 
creative industry (Gemser et al., 2012).  
The third theme in this thesis is the strategic-intent of foreign ownership of cinema 
assets by Chinese firms. Existing studies of foreign acquisitions have focused on the resultant 
financial performance of the acquired asset. Limited attention has been given to whether 
alternative motivations may exist for owning foreign assets (such as political intent). This is 
particularly relevant in the context of the creative industry, as it is one of the few industries 
which can change viewpoints and affect state institutions.  
1.2 Introduction of Chapters 
This thesis is a collection of five studies contained in three articles which have been 
done in close collaboration with my supervisors, Professor Mark Leenders and Dr. Ling Mei 
  
6 
 
Cong. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods have been employed. First, 
multiple-case-study analysis was used to determine the ownership tensions between user-
innovators and the platform in the virtual-world. Second, multiple regression analyses were 
used to determine financial-performance improvements in films made through an integrated 
value chain versus films made through a non-integrated value chain. Third, inductive analysis 
using mixed methods was employed to determine the strategic-intent of foreign acquisitions 
made by firms from emerging economies in the creative industry. 
This thesis examines ownership in a holistic approach. Each of the three articles 
explores one aspect of the ownership-to-performance paradigm. These aspects are ultimately 
intertwined and relational. The first article in Chapter 2 explores the concept of content 
ownership. I then transition to Chapter 3 by examining ownership of the distribution channels 
and how this influences performance. Chapter 4 considers the notion of transnational 
ownership and how nations and firms pursue ownership through political and business intent. 
This thesis is structured as follows. The first article (Chapter 2) focuses on the 
relationship between user-innovators and the platform within the virtual-world and how 
ownership of virtual-world assets is a source of tension. This Chapter argues that the 
separation of content and platform ownership and their inherent interdependencies are 
sources of ownership tensions which pose significant challenges to entrepreneurs. In addition, 
the virtual-world business model favors the platform’s ownership rights while undermining 
other kinds of competing ownership interests. The current structures around ownership rights 
and control seem detrimental to successful business creation, profitable technology 
development, and long-term user-innovation success. In-depth case-studies of virtual-user-
innovators are used to understand the role of ownership ambiguity in relation to success in a 
virtual-environment. The data consists of transcripts from court cases (1,279 pages), blogs, 
interviews, and expert commentary regarding six virtual-user-innovators. 
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The second article (Chapter 3) seeks to determine the financial-performance outcome 
of bringing motion-pictures to market for films produced through an integrated value chain 
versus that of similar films which use matched samples produced through a non-integrated 
value chain. The article aims to promote new governance insight and to create management 
awareness of how ownership affects content performance and downstream synergies for 
channel partners. It is argued that ownership of the value chain has a positive effect on the 
financial performance of the films. 
The third article (Chapter 4) examines the strategic-intent of foreign acquisitions 
made by the Chinese firm Dalian Wanda in the Western film industry. The chapter explores 
alternative theories and tests hypothesis based on business, financial, and political intent for a 
firm’s Western acquisitions. Here, it is argued that, for the most part, acquisitions made by 
private Chinese firms in the West are for non-political purpose. This article encompasses 
three separate studies which use a mixed-methods approach to triangulate strategic-intent 
factors. 
The different findings of the studies and the relationships between them are discussed 
in the conclusion (Chapter 5). Also, implications for theory and practice are presented. I 
finalize the thesis with suggestions for further research.   
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2. OWNERSHIP IN THE VIRTUAL-WORLD AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LONG-TERM USER-INNOVATION SUCCESS 
Abstract 
Virtual-worlds have become arenas for user-generated innovation, enabling a new wave of 
entrepreneurs to extract real-world value from virtual property. Interestingly, virtual-world 
property and revenue generation are understudied, and the concept of ownership in the meta-
verse is distinct and more complex than it is in the real-world. In this article, virtual-user-
innovation and ownership are conceptualized in two layers: 1) the content, and 2) the virtual 
platform. In-depth case-studies of virtual-user-innovators are used to understand the role of 
ownership ambiguity in relation to success in a virtual-environment. The data consists of 
transcripts from courts (1,279 pages), blogs, interviews, and expert commentary regarding six 
virtual-user-innovators. The findings reveal that the separation of content and platform 
ownership and their inherent interdependencies are sources of ownership tensions which pose 
significant challenges to entrepreneurs. Moreover, the virtual-world business model favors 
the platform’s ownership rights while undermining other kinds of competing ownership 
interests. The current structures around ownership rights and control seem detrimental to 
successful business creation, profitable technology development, and long-term user-
innovation success. The implications for theory and the practical implications for virtual 
entrepreneurs are discussed.  
Keywords: user-innovation, Second Life, virtual-world, ownership.  
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Millions of people around the world participate in the virtual-world through platforms 
like Second Life and other massive, multiplayer, online games (MMOGs) (Pharr, 2011). 
These virtual-worlds have evolved from being extensions of single-player games (Young, 
2009) into self-sufficient virtual societies where commerce, trade, and transacting are not 
only available but also encouraged (Kock, 2008; Chandra and Leenders, 2012; Alahuhta et 
al., 2016; Nambisan et al., 2017). The growth of virtual-worlds – supported by the ongoing 
proliferation of virtual-reality technology – provides a new wave of entrepreneurs and 
businesses with opportunities to innovate based on their creative skills and knowledge in 
areas such as product design, virtual tourism, space and environmental aesthetics, social 
exchange and simulation. This Chapter provides insight into how ownership ambiguity in the 
virtual-environment affects long-term user-innovation success. 
Virtual-worlds are growing, but they are still in an early stage in terms of economic 
size and impact. As a result, most virtual-technology entrepreneurs start out as users of a 
virtual platform who add services or product content. User-innovation is an important 
pathway to entrepreneurship. Research shows that users are an important source of 
innovation, as user-innovators tend to understand the product application better than non-
users (von Hippel, 1986). Users are uniquely positioned to identify problems and increase the 
usability of products and content that product developers often cannot. The ability to claim 
ownership and extract value from a product or service is an important factor in any pathway 
to entrepreneurship.  
The current regulatory framework dealing with ownership is based mostly on real-
world issues, cases, and transactional situations. Previous user-innovation studies have often 
focused on product transactions in real-world settings (e.g., mountain biking (Lüthje et al., 
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2005), rodeo kayaking (Hienerth, 2006), kite-surfing equipment (Schreier and Prügl, 2008), 
and rowing (Tietze et al., 2012)). More recent user-innovation studies have examined the 
phenomenon of transfer of functionality rather than control (Tietze et al., 2015). Whereas 
previous studies have looked at user-innovation through an ownership lens based on control, 
more recent functionality studies look at user-innovation through the perspective of shared 
ownership. That is, they have to do with the use and enjoyment of a product rather than 
control. For example, consider Uber and Airbnb (Tietze et al, 2015).  
In the virtual-world, virtual users are uniquely positioned to create solutions through a 
community-based, shared-innovation approach (Fuller et al., 2006). Like the real-world, 
virtual-world user-innovation requires that users utilize their expertise and skills to produce 
products tailored to the virtual consumer. That is, user-innovation has both an intellectual 
contribution component and a time investment component. Through this process, the user-
innovator adds value by satisfying the needs of the virtual consumer and improving the value-
creation process (Alahuhta et al., 2016). If the user-innovation process is successful, then the 
value of the product is recognized by virtual-world consumers through their willingness to 
buy the goods. The user-innovator can therefore generate economic benefit from the 
innovation process and is motivated to engage in this process through the ability to extract 
personal economic rewards from the enterprise. Ownership is the primary tool that facilitates 
the extraction of economic benefit from virtual users’ entrepreneurial pursuits. 
Special challenges face virtual-world user-innovators. In the virtual-world, the 
innovation process often relies heavily on the platform, since virtual property is not 
independently transferrable. The platform acts as a base for all virtual-world user-innovation 
activities (Kohler et al., 2009). As such, there is a dependent relationship between the content 
owner and the platform owner with respect to ownership rights.  
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A number of previous user-innovation studies have examined user-innovation in the 
context of ownership through the lens of the sporting-equipment sector (e.g., mountain biking 
(Christian et al., 2006) and kayaking (Hienerth, 2006)). However, virtual-world user-
innovation can be distinguished from these previous studies due to the need for other virtual-
world parties to realize and extract the benefits for the user-innovator. Moreover, unlike in 
the real-world, the user-innovator’s access to content is not exclusive, as it is entirely 
dependent on the ownership rights of the platform. These special boundary conditions for 
virtual-world entrepreneurs mean that there is a degree of prohibition from the platform in 
allowing entrepreneurs to fully generate substantive economic benefits freely – more so than 
in the real-world (Wessel, 1993; and Palmqvist et al., 2012).  
In-depth case-studies are used to build key propositions regarding how user-
innovation is affected by ownership in the virtual-world. The case-studies use data obtained 
from transcripts from virtual-world case law, expert commentary, interviews, discussions, 
news and blogs. It aims to inform virtual-world platforms and their innovating users about 
how virtual ownership is distinct from real-world ownership and about the pitfalls to 
undertaking user-innovation activities within the virtual-world and how to avoid them. 
2.2 VIRTUAL-WORLD AND OWNERSHIP 
Understanding what constitutes a virtual-world is important given both its practical 
and theoretical implication. Schroeder (2008) describes a virtual-world as “persistent online 
social spaces.” That is, a virtual-world is “a computer-generated display that allows or 
compels the user (or users) to have a sense of being present in an environment other than the 
one they are actually in, and to interact with that environment” (Schroeder, 1996). Virtual-
worlds can be distinguished from MMOGs in that their dominant purpose is to facilitate 
social interaction compared with an environment revolving around a central gaming narrative 
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(Steinkuehler and Williams, 2006). Thus, a virtual-world can be said, in summary, to utilize 
both software and hardware to enable interaction with a simulated, three-dimensional 
environment in real-time. This is achieved through input devices like monitor and keyboard. 
At the same time, the system provides a degree of immersion, of being physically present 
inside the virtual-world. Virtual-worlds also differ from virtual-environments such as app 
stores in that the creation, use, and extraction of property in a virtual-world depends on the 
platform’s ownership rights, whereas no such requirement exists in a virtual-environment 
(Steinkuehler and Williams, 2006). This key distinction is important, because ownership in a 
virtual-environment reflects more closely society’s normative understanding of the concept of 
ownership whereas virtual-world ownership is often poorly understood. The fact that the 
terms virtual-world and virtual-environment are often used interchangeably exacerbates the 
lack of understanding by virtual-world users regarding how ownership in the virtual-world 
differs from that of ownership in a virtual-environment.  
2.2.1 Ownership 
Ownership is an essential motivator to sustained and ongoing user-innovation. Often 
owning something involves paying consideration for an item that result in the transfer of 
rights to the purchaser, who can then deal with the purchased item. This preconceived notion 
of ownership cannot apply equally in the virtual-world because the rights ordinarily attached 
to such transactions are not clearly apparent (Burk, 2016). It is often not clear what type of 
right is attached to virtual-world purchases.  
Traditionally, ownership in the virtual-world has emphasized the element of possession as 
paramount, but this is slowly evolving. Today, virtual-world ownership falls into two distinct 
categories:  
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1. that in which all virtual-world property is owned by the platform and users have a 
license from the platform to use virtual property, and 
2. that which allows users to own some virtual property but not others. 
Whoever has possession of a property is deemed to be the owner. This approach is 
motivated by the developer’s desire to avoid any unnecessary legal complications. For 
example, the terms-of-service for Blizzard’s popular World of Warcraft states the following:  
“All rights and title in and to the Program and the Service (including without 
limitation any user accounts, titles, computer code, themes, objects, characters, 
character names)…are owned by Blizzard or its licensors.” [Clause 4, World of 
Warcraft terms-of-use] 
In cases in which users purchase an in-world item, what they are buying is not 
ownership of the item but rather a license from the developers to use the items subject to the 
respective terms-of-service. In essence, there has only been a transfer of control from the 
platform to the purchaser without a transfer of the suite of rights and legal protections one 
would normally expect to be included in such transactions. In the latter form of ownership, 
users are given intellectual property ownership rights to their creations, whereas the 
underlying platform code which gives life to those creations remains the property of the 
platform. One of the leading platforms that has allowed this form of ownership is Second 
Life, a focal point for this study. Until 29 April 2010, Clause 3.2 of the Second Life terms-of-
service provided the following: 
“Linden Lab acknowledges and agrees that…you will retain any and all 
applicable copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to any 
Content you create using the Service.” [Clause 3.2, Second Life terms-of-service 
– through 29 April 2010] 
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Though Clause 3.2 was amended after 29 April 2010, to provide a more traditional 
conception of virtual-world ownership, Second Life can still be distinguished from other 
license-based virtual-worlds by the fact that its dominant purpose is not a game but a place 
for user-generated creations which allows users to extract real-world value from virtual 
property. The Second Life website affirms this point by stating that, “Second Life is a 3D 
world where everyone you see is a real person and every place you visit is built by people just 
like you.” There are, however, significant complications for this type of ownership, both in 
defining the owned property and extracting the property independent of the platform 
(Harwood and Garry, 2014). This problem is unique to virtual-worlds and causes significant 
tensions between content owners and platforms when disputes arise.  
2.2.2 User Generated Content 
The classical notion of ownership is built on the foundation of rights and control 
(Smith, 1993). Ownership rights can be exploited to generate benefits for the content owner 
without necessarily giving up the underlying rights to ownership. To own something is an 
independent exercise, and the ability to exercise the owner’s rights and control over the 
owned property is not generally subject to a third party. This differs in the case of virtual-
world ownership and has implications for user-innovators who develop content in the virtual-
world. While on the surface virtual ownership still has the attributes of requiring rights and 
control over the owned property, the existence of the property itself and the ability of the user 
to exercise those rights and control over the property is subject to the rights and control of the 
platform. Gebert et al., (2004) noted that, where users feel they have sufficient control over a 
situation, they are more likely to initiate innovative activities to improve the situation. A lack 
of control has been shown to reduce confidence and to diminish the desire to respond to 
observed inefficiencies (Shepherd et al., 2013). Too much control can sometimes lead to a 
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lack of openness and internal orientation, negatively affecting other stakeholders 
(O’Shannassy and Leenders, 2016).  
Granting ownership to content creators is innovation maximizing, as it provides a 
mechanism for value appropriation, which then creates additional innovations. Balkin and 
Noveck, in their book, The State of Play Law, Games, and Virtual Worlds (2006) note the 
following: 
“[B]y safeguarding players’ intellectual property rights and giving them the 
right to make money from their creation, [developers] foster genuine creativity 
and the production of new objects and institutions, rather than mere crafting or 
tinkering.” [Balkin and Noveck, 2006 at page 9] 
The separation of ownership and control can also be a barrier to continued user-
innovation (Nambisan et al., 2017). Users who merely have control but lack ownership are 
less likely to “develop and realize ideas than users who possess both ownership and control” 
(Tietze et al., 2015). Moreover, if users feel they have less control, “their original aspiration 
to initiate change is subjectively reduced” to the point at which they consider the change 
unnecessary (Tietz et al., 2015).  
Virtual-world property can be very similar to tangible, real-world property, but the 
underlying rights work out differently (Moringiello, 2010). A virtual car in Second Life will 
be a three-dimensional representation of a real car and will behave like a real car: If a virtual 
user is driving the car, then no one else can drive the car. It is understandable that the concept 
of ownership in the virtual-world, being so similar to society’s normative understanding of 
tangible property, can induce users to think that normative notions of ownership apply to the 
virtual-world. The key difference between real-world ownership and virtual ownership is the 
dependency on the platform to exercise the ownership rights of the content owner. In recent 
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years, scholars have wrestled with the idea of how virtual property should be construed. 
Some argue for a utilitarian model, while others propose a Lockean natural-rights theory and 
still others view virtual property purely as an extension of intellectual property (Lastowka 
and Hunter, 2004). Regardless of which model best fits virtual ownership, most, if not all 
commentators “agree that the law ought to recognize virtual property as property and vest 
someone with those rights” (Vacca, 2008).  
2.3 A FRAMEWORK OF VIRTUAL-WORLD OWNERSHIP 
Virtual ownership can be divided into platform ownership and content ownership. In 
Table 2.1, the elements to ownership are broken down into rights and control to help us 
examine how these are affected by the interdependent nature of ownership between the 
platform and the content creators within virtual-worlds. 
Table 2.1: Initial Theoretical Framework for Virtual-world ownership Dimensions 
 Rights Control 
Platform 
owner 
• Right to broad definition of 
terms-of-service 
• Right to unilateral 
amendment of terms-of-
service 
• Right to terminate user 
accounts and confiscate 
virtual property 
• Control of in-world 
behavior and activities 
• Control of dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
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Content 
owner 
• Uncertain whether virtual 
property is a legally 
recognized form of property 
• Uncertain over meaning of 
virtual-world ownership 
Rights that should be vested to 
content owners: 
• Right to intellectual property 
over virtual property 
• Right to derive benefits from 
virtual property 
• Inability to extract 
virtual property into the 
real-world 
• Susceptible to changes to 
the terms-of-service 
Control that should be vested to 
content owners: 
• Control of virtual 
property mediated by 
interests of platform 
 
 
Legal, regulatory, and governance perspectives will also be explored, with a particular 
focus on how dispute-resolution mechanisms in the virtual-world deal with disagreements 
regarding the terms-of-service.  
2.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
A multiple-case-study design (Shane, 2000; and Yin, 2003) is used to validate the 
initial conceptual ideas that emerge from the ownership tension in virtual-worlds. The 
comparative case-studies allow for investigation and analysis of how user-innovation and 
entrepreneurship are affected by ownership in the virtual-world (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007).  
Extensive data for the case-study was collected from more than a thousand pages of 
transcripts from actual court cases, data from discussion boards, expert commentary, 
interviews, news items, and blogs. The diversity of the data sources creates a rich 
combination of data which can be used to validate and enrich the initial conceptual ideas 
around virtual ownership. Case law provides an opportunity to examine the circumstances 
  
18 
 
surrounding the disputes and provides exclusive insight into judicial thinking, expert 
witnesses, academic and scholarly insight and previous case law relevant to the topic in 
dispute.  
The case materials include 1,279 pages of transcripts and materials from court 
proceedings in the last 10 years. Court transcripts offer rich information about both the 
dispute and the events that led to the disagreement. Case documents were collected from 
public sources such as JUSTIA (https://dockets.justia.com/), PACER 
(https://www.pacer.gov/), Digital Media Law Project (http://www.dmlp.org/), the U.S. 
Government Publishing Office (https://gpo.gov/), and legal case databases such as Lexis 
Nexis (http://www.lexisnexis.com/) and West Law (http://westlaw.com). Importantly, court 
transcripts are supplemented with other unstructured and less formalized data sources—such 
as commentary, news, interviews, discussions, and blogs—which provide opportunities for 
triangulation. The supplementary data was collected from various sources such as virtual-
world discussion sites, Virtually Bind (http://www.virtuallybind.com), Modem World 
(http://modemworld.me/), and other sources which deal specifically with virtual-world topics. 
Moreover, interviews were conducted with virtual-world users to provide additional insight 
into the motivation and challenges of user-innovators in their user-innovation journey within 
virtual-worlds.  
A key challenge in building theory on this topic involves case selection. Given the 
explorative nature of this Chapter and the lack of maturity of the subject matter, this is 
especially important. The objective is to find cases which are suitable for illustrating the logic 
of user-innovation and ownership in the virtual-world (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Given that the majority of existing jurisprudence on this topic relates to cases that were heard 
in U.S. courts, the U.S. is chosen as the jurisdiction for case sampling. The main selection 
criteria for cases include the following: 1) evidence of user-innovation evident in the scenario 
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of the case law, 2) evidence of user entrepreneurship in the scenario of the case law, and 3) 
issues involving virtual ownership in the scenario of the case law.  
Table 2.2 sets out the selected cases together with a brief description of the case 
scenario in dispute. The six cases selected are, 1) Eros, 2) Letherwood, 3) Minsky, 4) 
Ozimals, 5) Bragg, and 6) Evans.   
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Table 2.2: Case Sampling Data 
Case Types of Court 
Documents 
Total 
Pages 
Case Summary Disputes 
User-to-user disputes 
1. Eros - Summary of 
proceedings; 
- Written 
arguments 
- Summary of 
claims 
- Court ruling 
76 
pages 
Eros sold virtual objects 
in Second Life. He 
found other users 
selling unauthorized 
copies of his creation. 
Eros sued for 
intellectual property 
infringement. 
- Unauthorized sale 
of virtual object; 
- Infringement of user 
intellectual property 
rights. 
2. Leatherwood - Summary of 
proceeding 
- Written 
arguments 
- Witness 
statements 
- Court ruling 
44 
pages 
Eros sold virtual objects 
in Second Life. 
Leatherwood found an 
exploit within Second 
Life which would allow 
him to duplicate items 
created by Eros. Eros 
sued for intellectual 
property infringement. 
- Sale of duplicate 
virtual object; 
- Infringement of user 
intellectual property 
rights. 
3. Minsky - Summary of 
claim 
- Statement of 
the parties 
- Written 
arguments 
179 
pages 
Minsky owned the 
trademark SLART. 
Another resident ran an 
art gallery called 
SLART Garden. 
Minsky requested 
Linden Lab take action 
against SLART Garden. 
Linden Lab sought to 
have Minsky’s 
- Infringement of user 
intellectual property 
rights - trademark. 
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trademark cancelled 
instead. 
4. Ozimals - Statements 
of the parties 
- Court ruling 
- Written 
arguments 
333 
pages 
Ozimals sold virtual 
bunnies in Second Life. 
Another user who sold 
virtual horses sued 
Ozimals for intellectual 
property infringement.  
- Infringement of user 
intellectual property 
rights. 
User-to-platform disputes 
5. Bragg - Witness 
statements 
- Summary of 
claims 
- Statements 
of the parties 
- Written 
arguments 
492 
pages 
Bragg found a way to 
buy virtual property 
below market value. 
Linden subsequently 
closed Bragg’s account 
confiscating all his 
virtual property. 
- Purchase of virtual 
property; 
- Platform’s unilateral 
termination of 
user’s account and 
property. 
6. Evans - Summary of 
claim 
- Written 
arguments 
- Court ruling 
 
155 
pages 
Evans sued Linden Lab 
for amending its terms-
of-service thus 
amending user rights to 
ownership. He claimed 
that Linden Lab had 
misled him into 
investing money into 
the platform. 
- Purchase of virtual 
property; 
- Platform’s unilateral 
termination of 
user’s account and 
property. 
  
  
22 
 
The case-sampling information reflected in Table 2.2 exposes the diverse and varied 
case law sources used in this case-study. The first four cases involve user-to-user disputes 
while the last two cases represent user-to-platform disputes. From the cases identified, a 
broad range of hindrances within the virtual-world were explored in relation to user-
innovation, the entrepreneurship process, and how virtual ownership affects this process. By 
considering the cases with reference to the competing ownership interests (platform 
ownership and content ownership), reasoned inferences can be drawn regarding how user-
innovation and entrepreneurship in the virtual-world are affected by virtual ownership. 
2.5 RESULTS 
As discussed, virtual-worlds like Second Life have relevance beyond a purely gaming 
or social context. As worlds like Second Life demonstrate, virtual-worlds have wide-ranging 
applications, including real-world applications. The analysis below starts by taking a platform 
angle.  
2.5.1 Platform Ownership 
The terms-of-service regulates the relationship between the platform and content 
owners. It forms a binding contractual obligation not with the user base as a whole but rather 
with each individual user. The findings suggest that the terms-of-service is poorly suited for 
governing the relationship between user and platform. The rights the terms-of-service 
purports to protect (primarily, property rights), are rights that bind entire classes of 
individuals under a common understanding through the universal application of laws rather 
than rights, which bind individuals based on contract. In the case of user-to-user disputes—
because contracts are designed to bind only those individuals who are party to the 
agreement—the platform’s handling of such disputes will be, at its core, a business decision 
rather than a legal one. Cases such as Minsky exhibit this trait, as the decision of the platform 
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to cancel the user’s trademark is made with business expediency in mind. The platform’s 
unilateral actions take advantage of the power imbalance between the content owner and the 
platform for which the platform fully exploits. Given that the virtual-world platform has a 
core objective of maximizing profit, its actions, regardless of what is contained in the terms-
of-service, will be dictated by this objective rather than by any legal or governance basis. In 
addition, in user-to-platform disputes such as Bragg, the wide construct of the terms-of-
service allows the platform significant power to control not only in-world behavior but also 
how disputes with the platform are handled. 
2.5.1.1 Platform’s right to unilateral amendment to terms-of-service 
The terms-of-service for virtual-worlds is often inflexible and rigid. The take-it-or-
leave-it basis with which the terms-of-service is presented to users demonstrates that the 
provisions it contains are very much one-sided in favor of the platform. The analysis reveals 
that, as a result of cases like Evans, there are significant tensions in the platform’s ability to 
unilaterally amend the relationship with individual users through amendments to the terms-
of-service. In the real-world, a key incentive to ownership is its durability, stability and 
certainty. This is not the case in the virtual-world. In Evans, the complaint noted that, 
“Linden made a calculated business decision to depart from the industry standard of denying 
that participants had any rights to virtual items, land and/or goods.” Evans alleged that 
Philip Rosedale, the creator of Second Life, actively promoted virtual-property ownership 
within the platform to induce, according to the complaint, some 50,000 users to invest as 
much as USD$100 million in the acquisition of virtual property. The complaint cited 
numerous press releases, media interviews, and statements made by Philip Rosedale that the 
platform would protect user rights to their property and not interfere with the exploitation or 
use of these virtual properties. Prior to Evans, Linden Lab had consistently touted the ability 
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of users to own property as one of the key benefits of using Second Life. The then CEO of 
Second Life noted the following in a Guardian interview: 
“We like to think of Second Life as ostensibly as real as a developing 
nation…The fundamental basis of a successful developing nation is property 
ownership…We started selling land free and clear, and we sold the title, and we 
made it extremely clear that we were not the owner of the virtual property.” 
[“Second Life and the Virtual Property Boom” The Guardian: Gamesblog, 14 
June 2005] 
The case also quotes Rosedale as saying: “What you have in Second Life is real and 
it’s yours” and “It doesn’t belong to us. We have no claim to it.” The case alleges that 
following the declaration, Linden Lab quietly changed its contract terms and the language on 
its website by deleting the word ownership. For example, the complaint noted that a question 
on the FAQ page had read “why would I want to own land?” which was quietly amended to 
read “why would I want to have land?.” This was, as the complaint noted: “without 
consideration, the consumer’s knowledge or consent.” This case was eventually settled, 
resulting in the payout of some USD$172,000. Evans reveals the susceptibility of users to 
changes to the terms-of-service. Users who rely on certain rights and protections enshrined in 
the terms-of-service can have those rights amended unilaterally, often without their consent 
or knowledge. As such, there is less certainty of virtual-world ownership, as any legal 
protections afforded to content owners can be amended unilaterally by the platform. This 
leads to users feeling misled after they have invested heavily into a platform’s success. 
The court’s view in both Evans and Bragg was that Philip Rosedale had actively 
rather than passively marketed Second Life by using ownership as a lure to attract users from 
other platforms. In Bragg, the court concluded as follows: 
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COURT: “[Rosedale] was the hawker sitting outside Second Life’s circus 
tent, singing the marvels of what was contained inside to entice customers 
to enter…Significantly, participants could even interact with Rosedale’s 
avatar on Second Life during town hall meetings that he held on the topic of 
virtual property.” 
[Bragg, Inc 487 F. Supp 2d at 601] 
Linden Lab contends the following: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: “[S]ellings land free and clear…and selling ‘title’ 
are metaphors or analogies to the concept of ownership of real property, as 
what is ‘owned’ with respect to ‘virtual land’ in Second Life is in fact a 
license to computing resources.” 
[Bragg, 487 F.Supp. 2d 593] 
Given that Second Life’s terms-of-service allows Linden Lab to amend its 
relationship with its users, users are often unaware that their rights to ownership can be 
unilaterally terminated. Such decisions are not motivated by ideals of fairness but by business 
efficacy. While the broad construct is not in itself a point of tension, it is this ability to 
unilaterally amend content owner rights that creates significant tension between the 
competing ownership interests. Cases like Bragg, which concern the unilateral confiscation 
of content owner property, and Evans, which deal with the unilateral amendment of user’s 
content ownership, all have at their roots the wide construct of the platform’s powers over the 
rights and control of content owners. Prior to 29 April 2010, Second Life users were able to 
own their creation within the platform. This was subsequently amended so that all in-world 
property is owned by the platform. In both Bragg and Evans, it was asserted that users had 
placed significant reliance on previous claims made by Linden Labs in deciding to invest in 
the platform and to contribute to the platform’s success. For example, Judge Robreno in 
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Bragg cited numerous statements made by Linden Labs which purported to induce users to 
sign up by offering “ownership” over their in-world creations. 
“Until now, any content created by users for persistent sate worlds…has become 
the property of the company developing and hosting the world…We believe our 
new policy recognizes the fact that persistent world users are making significant 
contributions to building these worlds and should be able to both own the 
content they create and share in the value that is created. The preservation of 
users’ property rights is a necessary step toward the emergence of genuinely real 
online worlds.” [Bragg 487 F Supp 2d 593] 
Although the terms-of-service allowed the platform to amend the ownership rights of 
content owners, it creates a tension between the competing ownership interests. In particular, 
when ownership interests are confiscated or cancelled without adequate compensation to the 
content owners, significant strain appears in the relationship between content owners and the 
platform. The ability of the platform to unilaterally amend content ownership rights creates 
uncertainty that inhibits future growth in innovation activities.  
2.5.1.2 Platform’s control of dispute-resolution mechanisms 
There are significant power imbalances between the content owners and the platform. 
This is evident not only from the structure of the virtual-world but also from the contractual 
terms which bind the content owners. Structurally, administrative power within virtual-
worlds is centralized in the platform whereas user power is dispersed amongst each virtual-
world participant. Platform ownership can be likened to a governing authority except without 
any of the fundamental restrictions on the exercise of that authority. One-sided unilateral 
actions taken by the platform affect the rights of content owners, thereby creating conflict 
with the platform. In the memorandum notes of 30 May, 2007, Judge Robreno, presiding over 
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Bragg, on numerous occasions noted the unconscionability of Linden Lab’s terms-of-service 
and the power imbalance between the content owner and that of the platform. These 
comments include the following: 
COURT: “…overly harsh or one-sided results that “shock the 
conscience.”” 
COURT: “In effect, the TOS [terms-of-service] provide Linden with a 
variety of one-sided remedies to resolve disputes while forcing its 
customers to arbitrate any disputes with Linden.” 
COURT: “…neither in its briefing nor at oral argument did Linden even 
attempt to offer evidence that “business realities” justify the one-sidedness 
of the dispute resolution scheme that the TOS constructs in Linden’s favor.” 
COURT: “…it is a one-sided means which tilts unfairly, in almost all 
situations in Linden’s favor.” 
[Bragg, 487 F.Supp 2d at paragraphs 75, 89, 104 and 107 respectively] 
The terms-of-service is designed to stop users from bringing disputes against the 
platform. Operationally, the terms-of-service deters users from seeking remedy from courts 
by setting a high cost threshold to such an action. The Second Life terms-of-service forces 
users into arbitration with the platform. In considering whether the Second Life terms-of-
service in Bragg was unconscionable, the court noted that it would cost users significantly 
more to resolve the disputes through mandatory arbitration as set out in the terms-of-service 
than to bring the same claims to court.  
COURT: “The court’s own estimate [of arbitration proceedings] place the 
amount that Bragg would likely have to advance at $8,625, but they could 
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reach as high as $13,687.50. Any of these figures are significantly greater 
than the costs that Bragg bears by filling his action in a state or federal 
court.” 
[Bragg, 487 F.Supp 2d at paragraph 95] 
Cases like Evans and Bragg affect Linden Lab’s ability to give confidence to user-
innovators within its platform. These cases reveal the inability under the current model to 
effectively manage and resolve user-to-platform disputes.  
2.5.1.3 Platform’s inconsistent enforcement of user rights 
There is a lack of effective enforcement of users' rights by the platform. This issue is 
precipitated to a degree by the uncertainty surrounding what constitutes virtual ownership and 
the imaginary wall separating the avatars from the users. Eros, Leatherwood, Ozimals, and, to 
a lesser extent, Minsky all deal with the unauthorized sale, use and/or reproduction of a 
protected object by other Second Life users. An important point is the lack of interest by 
Linden Lab to enforce the rights of content owners of virtual property within Second Life. In 
most cases, the user-innovator did not seek a lawsuit as the first option. Rather, they 
attempted to engage Linden Lab to enforce their intellectual property rights. In Eros, a 
number of user-innovators attempted to stop Simons and other unidentified Second Life users 
who were duplicating objects protected by intellectual property. They first attempted to 
engage with the infringer to settle the matter on a user-to-user basis. One of user-innovators, 
Kevin Alderman, CEO of Eros LLC in an interview noted that, 
“We sent a cease and desist letter and a settlement proposal, and the nature 
of the response established that this guy controls the ‘Rase Kenzo’ avatar.” 
[Kevin Alderman, CEO of Eros LLC speaking to Virtually Blind on 27 
October 2007] 
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Following this, the user-innovators attempted to have Linden Lab enforce their rights 
as content owners. Alderman continued: 
“We originally tried to go through Linden Lab. We filed support tickets and 
abuse reports. We even sent a letter to Robin and copied Philip. We got 
nothing.” [Kevin Alderman, CEO of Eros LLC speaking to Virtually Blind 
on 27 October 2007] 
It was only after this that the user-innovators proceeded to sue.  
Eros further demonstrates the difficulty of identifying the identity of content 
infringers in virtual-worlds. This issue was similarly apparent in Leatherwood where, identify 
the infringer, a private detective had to be hired. Here, the defendant was not a sophisticated 
infringer but rather a nineteen-year-old living with his grandparents. It is foreseeable that 
more sophisticated infringers may not be as easy to identify or locate. Even in Leatherwood’s 
case, the identification took a significant expenditure of time, money and resources on the 
part of the content owners. Noting that the user-innovators in Eros and in turn Leatherwood 
constituted some of the largest merchants on Second Life, it is possible that smaller 
merchants will not have the financial resources to undertake an extensive search for rights 
infringers. In the memorandum notes of 30 May 2007, Judge Robreno, presiding over Bragg, 
noted the high threshold virtual-world users have to navigate before they can deal with a 
dispute in a court of law. 
COURT: “Taken Together, the lack of mutuality, the costs of arbitration, 
the forum selection clause, and the confidentiality provision that Linden 
unilaterally imposes through the TOS [serms-of-service] demonstrate that 
the arbitration clause is not designed to provide Second Life participants 
an effective means of resolving disputes within Linden.” 
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[Bragg, 487 F.Supp 2d at paragraph 107] 
The current dispute-resolution framework for enforcing content owners’ rights in the 
virtual-world falls short of the standards content owners expect in the real-world. At a 
minimum, there has been a general lack of interest from the platform to help the infringed 
parties enforce their ownership rights. At most, Linden Lab will not seek to assist the content 
owner but will instead attempt to have the ownership rights of the content owner dissolved 
entirely. In Minsky, a user-innovator sued Linden Lab, Second Life user Victor Vezina, and 
past and present Chairmen of Linden Lab’s Board of Directors over unauthorized use of his 
trademark “SLART.” Initially, upon discovering that his trademark was being used, Minsky 
requested Linden Lab to transmit to the offending user a cease and desist order. Linden Lab 
refused. Linden then filed a case against Minsky to cancel his trademark registration. When 
the court granted a preliminary injunction in Minsky’s favor, Linden Lab sought to terminate 
his Second Life account. This case is interesting because the dispute did not initially involve 
Linden Lab. In contrast, this was a user-to-user dispute similar to Eros, Ozimals, and 
Leatherwood. However, unlike these cases, Linden sought to take action not against the rights 
infringers but against the right holder.  
2.5.2 Content Ownership 
The relationship between the virtual platform and the user-innovator is one built on 
mutual dependence. Without sufficient growth in user-innovation by content owners, the 
platform will stagnate, and without a platform there is no scalable world on which to build. 
The case-study reveals two key tensions between the platform and user-innovator: 1) there is 
uncertainty regarding whether the law allows ownership of virtual property, and 2) there is 
confusion over the definition of virtual ownership. 
2.5.2.1 Uncertainty over recognition of users’ virtual property  
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The mediating considerations for virtual-world ownership stem from the difficulty in 
separating the content property from the platform code. This form of ownership governance 
is highly problematic, as it does not provide any protections around the enforcement of 
content owners’ rights. In an interview with CNN, New York Law School Associate 
Professor James Grimmelmann referred to ownership in Second Life as “somewhere in…the 
16th century.” He continued:  
“I'm quite serious. When this stuff started out we were talking pre-
feudal…totally made up on the spot. They made [rules] pretty much in 
response to individual situations…But as this stuff got to be big business, 
the companies realized they had to start getting regular in administering 
justice. They couldn't be too irregular or people would quit.” [Associate 
Professor James Grimmelmann speaking to CNN in “Can people actually 
'own' virtual land?” 10 May 2010] 
The slow pace of legal reform also poses further challenges for virtual-world 
ownership. This sentiment is shared by Andrea Matwyshyn, an assistant professor of legal 
and business ethics at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania:  
“The law is a slow-moving elephant, and technology is a graceful gazelle… 
And it's a mismatch.” [Assistant Professor Andrea Matwyshyn speaking to 
CNN in “Can people actually 'own' virtual land?” 10 May 2010] 
Since there has been no formal recognition of virtual ownership, the ordinary 
protection afforded to owners does not exist in Second Life. For example, only when virtual 
users convert their virtual interests into real-world money do real-world legal protections 
apply.  
2.5.2.2 Uncertainty over meaning of users’ virtual ownership 
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The questions of what constitutes property in the virtual sense and what in fact can be 
owned are not readily comprehended by both platform and content owners. This issue was 
discussed in Evans. In this case, the parties had differing understandings of what the platform 
intended to provide when they offered ownership in Second Life. The user-innovator 
contended that users gained actual ownership in the normative sense of the word, whereas the 
defendants asserted that users merely owned copyright in the virtual property. Counsel for 
Evans made the following submission during oral argument on this motion: 
THE COURT: “What do class members own?” 
COUNSEL: “We believe that they own a piece of the Second Life world.” 
THE COURT: “So is it that you own code? Do you own a piece of the 
server that the code resides on?” 
COUNSEL: “…I don’t believe you own the server…The code, obviously, 
reside on a server. And the server…or the code creates a virtual-world. 
There’s a map…like there would be a real-world map. And there’s 
locations on the map. Similar in the sense that the internet, as an example, 
is really a map of various addresses. So if you own a domain name…what 
do you own? You own the domain name. So in a virtual-world, when you 
own a piece of land, you own the piece of land that corresponds on the map 
to that location that you purchased. So it’s similar to a domain name in the 
sense that there’s a specified location on a map and that’s what you 
own…It’s part of the overall Second Life world.” 
[Evans, Filing 107, Order by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu] 
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Therefore, the user-innovator’s conception of virtual property, as described in their 
Second Amended Complaint can be summarized as follow: 
COUNSEL: “The owner of the account is entitled to control the account 
and valuables’ electromagnetic record and may freely sell or transfer it. 
Although a participant’s account and valuables are “virtual,” they are 
valuable property in the real-world. Participants can auction them, sell 
them, license them or transfer them online and through other independent 
third parties, like eBay.com, slexchange.com, and others.” 
[Evans, Second Amended Complaint] 
This view is supported by Second Life residents such as Anshe Chung, known as the 
“Rockefella of Second Life,” who created her fortunes in the Second Life platform. Noting 
the changes to the Second Life terms-of-service concerning content ownership, she notes, 
 “Robin Linden has announced to remove land sales on private islands 
from the land finder. This comes after Linden Lab collected 13000 US$ … 
from me that I "bought" under the impression I would be able to advertise 
my land there. Speaking for Linden Lab, Robin insists on calling land sales 
in "Ansheland" "rental,” though owners have full control of their land and 
several residents successfully resold land they acquired in "Ansheland.” 
Residents have sold land in "Ansheland" to other residents.” 
She continued, 
“Linden Lab has the same power to reclaim land on the mainland. In the 
terms-of-service they even reserve the right to remove each of us from 
Second Life at their own discretion. There is no guarantee and nothing 
legally binding that one so-called "land owner" receives from Linden Lab 
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when "buying" land. There is nothing they hand over to us, all servers 
remain in their ownership.” 
In contrast, Linden Lab contends that users can own copyright in their creations and a 
license to use the Second Life computing resources, as set out in the terms-of-service. 
However, ownership interests in real or personal property beyond what is set out in the terms-
of-service is not provided, as the defense counsel noted: “You have to remember this stuff 
isn't real. It's a game on a computer.” Linden Lab argued as follows: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: “Linden has…made no allegations that we have changed 
the rules, have told people that when you create content in Second Life, unlike in 
other games, you own the intellectual property…The copy that you put on Linden’s 
server is Linden’s, and it’s always been very clear. The copy that you have in your 
own computer, if you put a copy in your computer, when we close your account, 
we haven’t taken away that copy and we haven’t taken away your 
copyright…What you owned you still own…Our right to remove the bits from our 
servers of a copy that you licensed to us, is not a property right that the plaintiff 
ever owned. There’s no coherent allegation that there is any such property right. It 
is not real property. It’s not personal property; it is an intellectual property.” 
[Evans, Filing 107, Order by Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu] 
Interestingly, Second Life residents see the ability to own property as one of the 
fundamental motivators to engage with the platform. As users such as ArchTx Edo stated in 
the official Second Life Forum, “Owning your own land and putting a house of your 
choosing on it, that you can modify anyway you please is greatly superior.” Unfortunately, 
Evans did not provide a ruling on this point, as the case was ultimately settled. However, the 
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case material illustrates some inherent difficulties in quantifying virtual-world property using 
a normative understanding of ownership. 
2.5.3 Summary of Key Tensions that Hinder User-Innovation Success 
The above analysis reveals six core ownership tensions that hinder user-innovation 
success, as set out in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of Tensions in Virtual-World that Hinders User-Innovation Success 
Case Tensions 
Broad 
platform rights 
given by terms-
of-service 
Platform’s 
unilateral 
amendment of 
terms-of-
service 
Platform’s control 
of 
dispute 
resolution 
mechanisms 
Platform’s 
inconsistent 
enforcement of 
user rights 
Uncertainty over 
recognition of 
users’ virtual 
property 
Uncertainty over 
meaning of 
users’ virtual 
ownership 
User-to-user disputes 
Eros    ✓   
Leatherwood    ✓   
Minsky ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  
Ozimals ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  
User-to-platform disputes 
Bragg ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Evans  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
 37 
 
Table 2.3 summaries the key ownership tensions. The behavior of the platform owner 
seems to be a key inhibitor of user-innovation across the analyzed cases. For user-to-user 
disputes, broad rights given to the platform and inconsistent enforcement of users’ rights have 
had an important impact on users’ innovation activity. Other tensions include forcing users 
into high-cost dispute-resolution regimes which favor the more powerful platforms. For user-
to-platform disputes, the inability to extract virtual property from the platform poses the most 
significant tension between platform and content owners. 
The ability of platforms to unilaterally amend their terms-of-services is another 
significant point of tension. The significance of Linden Lab’s ability to unilaterally amend its 
relationship with users cannot be understated. Whenever Linden makes changes its terms-of-
service based on a business efficacy basis, there are significant consequences for content 
owners, which can result in damage or destruction of in-world businesses affecting user 
livelihoods. In these cases, there is no obligation for Linden to offer users any compensation. 
For example, in July of 2007, Linden announced a ban on in-world gambling. Users who had 
invested in virtual casinos suddenly lost their investments. This decision had flow-on effects 
to the virtual banking sector where, in August 2007, the in-world bank, Ginko Finance, 
announced that it was unable to repay USD$750,000 back to investors because the ban on 
gambling had triggered a run on the bank’s cash reserves, thereby resulting in its insolvency 
and eventual collapse.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the interconnected nature of virtual-world ownership issues and 
illustrates broad overarching concerns such as the broad definition of the terms-of-service and 
the ability for the platform to unilaterally amend the terms-of-service, which affects the 
content owner’s ability to exercise their ownership rights. 
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Figure 2.1: Ownership Relationships Between the Platform and Content Owners with the Terms-of-Service. 
 
 
The governance structure is skewed in favour of the platform. Only the 
platform has the ability to amend the terms-of-service, which allows it to give 
itself broad powers of termination and control of content owner property. The 
red lines represent the interdependence between the content and platform 
owners. Content owners are highly susceptible to unilateral changes of the 
terms-of-service by the platform. Moreover, while content owners have control 
over their virtual world property, that control is tempered by the platform's 
ability to control user behaviours.
The terms-of-service gives the platform broad powers including rights to 
amend the contents of the terms-of-service. The terms-of-service also provides 
the content owners with the ability to own virtual property. However, there is 
uncertainty around the extent of this provision. In particular, it's unclear 
whether virtual property is a legally recognized form of property.
From the terms-of-service, both the platform and content owners have their 
own specific set of rights, duties and obligations.
The terms-of-service provides the rules regulating the relationship between the 
content owner with the platform. It is the overarching document providing the 
framework for all virtual world activities.
Terms-of-Service
Platform Ownership
The terms-of-service 
provides the 
platform with broad 
powers. These 
include:
Right to unilateral 
amendment of 
terms-of-service
Right to unilateral 
termination of user 
accounts
Control of user 
behaviour
Control of dispute 
resolution mechnism
Content Ownership
The terms-of-service 
gives content owners 
ability to own virtual 
property which 
allows content 
owners:
Right to derive 
benefits from virtual 
property
Can convert virtual 
currency into real 
world money
Control of virtual 
property
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Interestingly, Figure 2.1 shows ownership tensions which emerge from platform and 
user-innovator disagreements and user-to-user conflicts in which the platform gets involved. 
Overall, it is clear that a broad array of rights is allocated to the platform that go back to the 
terms-of-service and the power to literally shut down the operations of the user-innovator 
without providing many options for the user-innovator to extract any value. By denying users 
their perceived ownership rights in property, and consequently denying them their sources of 
income, platforms such as Linden Lab jeopardize the platform’s ability to attract new users 
and retain existing users. In the case of app stores, even when an app is taken down from the 
platform, the content owner still retains full ownership of the proprietary contents and is able 
to sell the app independently or through another platform; in the case of virtual-worlds, 
however, this is not possible. Moreover, the clarity and specificity of the take-down 
provisions in app stores also provide more certainty and guidance for users around acceptable 
use, thereby diminishing cases of un-transparent behavior by the platform. In the case of 
Second Life, however, the terms dealing with take-down are drafted broadly with no specific 
guidance regarding prohibited behavior. Ordinarily, innovation activities flourish when the 
terms are defined broadly enough to provide entrepreneurs with flexibility in their 
interpretation. However, in cases where power is concentrated disproportionately with the 
platform, a broad drafting of the terms means that the platform can interpret the terms to its 
benefit, setting aside any residual benefits to the user-innovator. Given the interdependence 
and the fact that platforms need content, a power shift seems beneficial to stakeholders. 
2.6 DISCUSSION 
This article presents one of the first studies to consider ownership in the virtual-world 
and emerging technology platforms and its links with sustainable user-innovation success. 
The case-study reveals that the development of content and the creation of value through the 
concept of virtual ownership are often poorly understood by virtual-world technology 
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entrepreneurs and that is “unformed, imprecise and mostly outdated” (Erlank, 2010). While 
there has been some recognition of virtual property, the ideals of property ownership from 
Linden Lab’s perspective, for example, differ from society’s normative understanding of 
ownership. Though licenses have become ubiquitous for online transactions, the license given 
to users by “[T]he Second Life terms-of-service…grant property rights that bear little 
resemblance to known property rights” (Moringiello, 2010).  
Ownership in the virtual-world differs from that of the real-world. Society’s 
normative understanding of ownership is one in which content and platform ownership rights 
are independent of one another; ownership in the virtual-world, however, cannot 
meaningfully separate content ownership from the platform. The findings reveal that 
separating content and platform ownership and their inherent interdependence poses 
significant challenges to entrepreneurs and is a point of substantial tension. In addition, the 
current virtual-ownership model favors platform owners while undermining other kinds of 
competing ownership interest, which is detrimental to long-term user-innovation success. 
Moreover, the one-sided arbitration clauses make it difficult for content owners to resolve 
disputes in an equitable and cost-effective manner. The tensions between platform and 
content ownership are more complex than previously theorized. In particular, the inability of 
content owners to extract property from the platform, and the ability for platform owners to 
unilaterally change the terms-of-service to suit specific business circumstances favorable for 
the platform, pose significant challenges and uncertainties for content owners. 
There are two broad inhibitors to continued user-innovation growth within virtual-
world platforms like Second Life. First, limiting the ownership rights of content creators will 
stifle user-innovation and creativity (Watkins et al., 2015). Second, the legal-governance 
model needs to be modified to remove barriers that unnecessarily impede user-innovation and 
entrepreneurship within the virtual-world environment and to create legal governance 
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mechanisms to avoid ownership-related conflict in the first place. There needs to be robust 
and equitable dispute-resolution mechanisms to better deal with disputes – both at a user-to-
user level and between user and platform and vice versa.  
The cases further reveal that content owners face substantial challenges both in 
undertaking entrepreneurial activities within virtual platforms and in the certainty around 
their relationship with the platform. At present, there is considerable uncertainty regarding 
whether virtual ownership is in fact recognized by law and the significant power imbalance, 
cost, and time in favor of the platform in resolving virtual-world disputes. There is also 
inherent uncertainty for the platform surrounding liability and loss of control of the rate of 
content creation. The terms-of-service attempts to ease some of these fears by reigning in the 
level of content ownership and by increasing the cost threshold for dispute resolution.  
Limiting the platform’s liability exposure, especially in cases of vicarious liability, 
may ease this uncertainty. In addition, content owners’ in-world property should be better 
protected and guarded against unilateral changes by the platform. Moreover, in cases where 
user accounts are shut, in-world property should be equitably disposed by the platform and 
any proceeds are passed on to the content owner. 
The findings suggest that in-world governance and regulation is not appropriately 
achieved by way of a terms-of-service. A terms-of-service governs only the relationship 
between individual users and the platform, but it should rather stem from an overarching 
document based on firm legal foundations which is binding for both the platform and the 
content owners. Changes which affect user rights should not be introduced unilaterally by the 
platform but should be put to users through a consultative and referendum process. 
Furthermore, the terms-of-service should be drafted specifically to address the broad 
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interpretation spectrum for the platform, given the current power imbalance in favor of the 
platform. 
2.6.1 Implication for Theory and User-Innovation Practice 
This study contributes to digital and virtual entrepreneurship theories and builds a 
comprehensive ownership-tension framework with which to study the success of user-
innovators. The results identify the ownership tensions and the resulting power play in favor 
of the platform. The uneven playing field between the platform and content owners results in 
significant inhibitions over the long-term and sustainable user-innovation success. This study 
represents the first time that ownership and user-innovation success in the virtual-world have 
been identified and explored in detail. 
The market for virtual-world applications is evolving from a space of specialized 
interest to a more mainstream channel of communication, commerce, entertainment, and 
social interaction. As such, questions of how virtual-world platforms adequately deal with 
legal issues such as property, torts, and privacy have become increasingly important and 
prominent. To date, these questions have largely been addressed by the application of 
contract law through the end-user license agreement or terms-of-service. However, as 
Fairfield (2008) notes, there are limitations to governance through contract alone: “…the best 
contract is not the EULA but a social contract among players”. 
The findings suggest that regulation needs to be created at a higher and more 
universal level so as to enshrine and protect user rights from broad interference by the 
platform. More importantly, if the user-innovators are successful, the total pie will grow, and 
both platform and user-innovator will benefit. The protection of user property rights in the 
legal system will potentially level the playing field and address key tensions around the 
power imbalance between the users and platform.  
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Restricting the platform’s ability to unilaterally amend the terms-of-service will also 
go some way toward giving user-innovators greater certainty in their investments within the 
platform. In addition, users should have greater involvement in any reform or changes which 
affect their rights through a more thorough consultation process which should see greater 
participation between the users and the platform. This may involve having user 
representatives on the platform’s decision-making and governance body or having impartial 
third parties appointed by both the users and the platform to decide on any disputes relating to 
virtual-world property issues.  
From a user-innovator perspective, this study shows that user-innovators need to both 
engage with the content and build deeper relationships with the platform owners. Getting a 
voice in strategic platform decisions may become more likely as the number of innovators 
grows. Ultimately, users can vote with their wallets on what platforms they engage with. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
On 26 March 2014, Mark Zuckerberg announced that Facebook acquired Oculus Rift 
for $2 billion. He noted that Oculus Rift would not just be a platform for gaming but also “for 
many other experiences…a new communication platform.” The introduction of virtual-reality 
systems such as Facebook’s Oculus Rift, Microsoft’s HoloLens, and HTC’s Vive will 
provide more opportunities for virtual-user-innovators to serve larger and more immersed 
audiences with content. More importantly, the way in which people in society live and 
interact is expected to lead to more questions regarding who owns what and what ownership 
truly means in the virtual marketplace (See Figure 2.2).   
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Figure 2.2: Sony’s PlayStation VR Headset 
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According to Digi-Capital, the virtual and augmented-reality technology market will 
be a $150 billion market by 2020. Increasingly, platforms are recognizing that their long-term 
success is directly dependent on user-innovation success. This has resulted in the growth of 
open virtual platforms to enable greater control by content owners. Several platforms have 
ambitions to be the leading virtual-world utilizing virtual-reality technology. Linden Lab, for 
example, is developing Project Sansar specifically for use with virtual-reality headsets. 
Project Sansar will allow users and firms to build their own virtual-reality experience by 
using learning from Linden Lab’s experience to run the Second Life platform. Early 
communications indicate that the new platform will be much more open and accessible for 
entrepreneurs, offering them ways to set stores and engage in transactions with respect to 
self-developed virtual products and service. It is in the long-term interest of both platform 
and content owners that the virtual-world’s social eco-system is conducive to users and their 
innovations.   
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3. THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATED MOTION PICTURE AND CINEMA 
OWNERSHIP ON CONTENT PERFORMANCE: FROM PROHIBITED 
PRACTICE TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE  
ABSTRACT 
This article seeks to determine the performance outcomes of bringing motion-pictures to the 
market through a channel which includes owned cinemas versus a channel with only 
independent cinemas. I examine this phenomenon by comparing non-constrained film studios 
in Australia with constrained Hollywood studios. Hollywood studios are constrained by the 
United States v Paramount Pictures Inc (1948) decision which prohibits Hollywood studios 
from owning cinemas; no such prohibition exists in Australia. Performance differences are 
expected to be time dependent and may affect the competitive dominance of Hollywood 
studies that are non-integrated by law. A cross-sectional study using data from both 
integrated and non-integrated value chains is employed to test hypotheses regarding the 
implications of channel integration and ownership on content performance. The findings 
reveal that vertical integration mitigates the dominant performance of Hollywood studios at 
key periods during a film’s box-office life cycle. This study aims to promote new governance 
insight and creates management awareness regarding how channel ownership affects 
downstream synergies and advantages for channel partners.  
Keywords: ownership, vertical integration, motion-picture, performance. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
“…What ultimately matters for companies, policy makers and economists alike is whether 
ownership structure affects corporate performance, and if so, how.” (Hu and Izumida, 2008, 
p.72) 
Film is one of the major growth industries of the twenty-first century. The creative 
industry, in particular film, is an important sector of the global economy which has so far 
received limited attention in ownership and performance literature (Leenders and Eliashberg, 
2011). The landmark United State Supreme Court decision in United States v Paramount 
Pictures Inc (1948) effectively prohibits Hollywood studios from owning their own cinemas 
and holding exclusivity rights regarding which cinemas may exhibit their films. This decision 
drastically transformed the way Hollywood films were produced, distributed, and exhibited. 
The outcome of this case has resulted in the divestment of cinema assets by the leading 
Hollywood studios, thereby allowing films to be shown in U.S. cinemas from any studio. The 
impact of this case continues to inform the general business practices of leading Hollywood 
studios and cinema operators in the United States to this day.  
In contrast, no such prohibition exists in many other countries. In Australia, several 
major cinema chains (Village and Dendy/Icon) actively distribute and produce films either 
independently or through partnerships with leading Hollywood studios for global 
consumption. Vertical integration allows these firms to reduce cost and increase efficiency 
for bringing films to market.  
The way in which consumers consume entertainment is also evolving. New market 
entrants such as Netflix, Hulu and Amazon can produce extensive content while owning the 
online distribution and exhibition platforms. This combination potentially offers a 
competitive advantage that is hard to replicate for traditional Hollywood studios and cinemas. 
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These new entrants seek to disrupt traditional film-ownership structures by taking advantage 
of regulatory environments which limit the effectiveness of traditional Hollywood studios. 
This contrast between the prohibitive competitive practices for Hollywood studios in the 
United States and the more liberal approach taken in Australia, China, and other online 
streaming service providers creates a unique opportunity for comparative analysis. This study 
seeks to examine the ownership to box-office performance link of films produced through 
non-constrained studios in Australia versus films produced by constrained Hollywood studios 
to determine whether vertical integration yields any competitive advantage for bringing new 
films to market. I propose that a different ownership structure might affect the performance 
of new films in the market at specific times during a film’s box-office life cycle. 
How ownership structures affect performance has been an important question for 
firms, academics, and governments. This question dates back to Berle and Means (1932), 
who first posited that the separation of ownership reduces management incentive to maximize 
corporate efficiency. This was subsequently refined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) into the 
agency theory, which expounds the alignment of varying and competing interests through 
ownership. Since the mid-1980s, several empirical studies have examined the ownership-to-
performance link with varying degrees of effectiveness (Bergström, 1999; Eisenberg, 1999; 
Baker et al., 2002; Crabb, 2005). Marketing scholars suggest that ownership enhances the 
consequences of performance (e.g., Im and Workman, 2004; Kirca et al., 2005). Although 
ownership plays a pivotal role in the success of bringing new products to market, the 
empirical evidence supporting a positive effect of ownership on performance is not consistent 
in the literature. On the one hand, some studies find a positive relationship between 
ownership and new product success (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; 
Cho, 1998; Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holdemess et al., 1999; 
Xu and Wang, 1999; Earle et al., 2005). On the other hand, several studies show no direct 
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impact of ownership on performance (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; D’Aveni and 
Ravenscraft, 1994; Walston et al., 1996). This inconclusiveness motivates further research to 
investigate the potential moderating variables and thereby to explain the unstable relationship 
between ownership and performance. Despite the progress in this area, one important 
moderator is still missing in the literature: that is, how different ownership structures and 
their external regulatory constraints affect ownership-to-performance outcomes. Ownership 
structure and external regulatory environment are regarded as among the most important 
complementary resources for organizational strategy success (Chandler, 1962; Olson, Slater, 
and Hult, 2005). For example, firms may achieve strategic objectives only when the 
ownership structure and regulatory environment support the envisaged corporate strategy 
(e.g., Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Gedajlovic (1993) also argues 
that ownership structure serves as the moderating variable in the strategy to performance link. 
It has therefore been suggested that variation in performance results are heavily dependent on 
the ownership structure and regulatory environments in the industry in which the firm is 
embedded (Hu and Izumida, 2008). 
This article contributes to the marketing and management literature by suggesting that 
ownership structure affects the performance of films at the box-office. In this study, I 
examine the influence of vertical integration on the performance of films at the box-office. 
That is, films produced through a vertically integrated structure perform better than 
comparable films produced through a non-integrated structure. This has not been considered 
in previous studies. Investigation of the unknown impact of ownership structure in film 
making may make key contributions to the literature by providing important new insights and 
new implications for business practice in the film and creative industry.  
3.2 THE GLOBAL FILM INDUSTRY 
  
50 
 
Film making is inherently risky due to the need for high capital and the uncertainty of 
success at the box-office (Wasko, 2003). The ability to recoup costs for the production and 
distribution of motion-pictures is heavily dependent on the film’s performance at the box-
office (Eliashberg et al., 2006; Piazza and Olausson, 2007; Gemser et al., 2012). As such, the 
global motion-picture market has traditionally been concentrated in Hollywood studios 
(Cones, 1997). These studios have been producing and distributing motion-picture contents 
since the 1920s; as a result, they have been able to build up well-established production and 
distribution infrastructures and know-how together with extensive libraries of motion-picture 
related intellectual property which continue to be exploited to this day (Silver, 2008).  
The global film industry, based on global box-office revenue performance, has been 
extremely resilient to external market forces and continues to be the entertainment medium of 
choice when compared with other activities such as theme parks or sporting events (Piazza 
and Olausson, 2007).  
 
Source: Motion Picture Association of America 
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In the years between 2009 to 2016, global box-office revenue exceeded $38.6 billion 
(see Figure 3.1). It is interesting to note the relative stagnation in the performance of the 
North American box-office and the significant growth in box-office revenue from 
international box-office revenue during this period. In the period of 2009 to 2016, the North 
American box-office grew 5.18% compared with 38.28% growth internationally over the 
same period. This means that, in 2009, international box-office revenue constituted just over 
1.7 times the North American box-office sales as opposed to 2016, when international box-
office revenue constituted just over 2.45 times the North American box-office sales. 
Hollywood’s dominance over the global film market has much to do with its formula 
for producing films that result in box-office success (Eliashberg et al., 2006; Silver, 2008). 
According to Silver (2008), Hollywood’s success at the box-office is due to three key 
characteristics. These include, 1) marketing, distribution and promotional capability; 2) 
product development and pricing capability; and 3) barriers to entry. 
Marketing capability refers to both market research capability and marketing 
management capability. Hollywood studios have conducted market research since the 1920s, 
using a variety of channels which include environmental scanning (Wasko, 1994), market 
intelligence gathering (Goldberg, 1991), and talent spotting (Wasko, 2000). Studios also have 
a worldwide network of distribution offices which are utilized as intelligence-gathering 
channels. Professional advisors; channel partners; trade press; and attendance at film markets, 
festivals and conventions provide additional market know-how (Epstein, 2005; Gemser, 
2007). Market research therefore facilitates better-informed management decisions in strategy 
formulation, new product development, and marketing management. Due to the number of 
new releases, films invariably have a short life-cycle (Littwak, 1986). This therefore makes 
the effective segmentation, targeting, positioning, and integration of marketing 
communications critical to box-office success (Silver, 2008). In particular, Hollywood 
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studios strategically invest resources into the effective positioning of films through 
advertising and marketing materials such as trailers (Silver, 2008). In recent times, 
Hollywood has used significant marketing force in launching new films. The average 
marketing budget for a new Hollywood release is USD$35.9 million (Gerbrandt, 2010), 
which exceeds the production budget of most independent films (Silver, 2008). The evidence 
also suggests that marketing for Hollywood productions is centrally driven and strategically 
coordinated (Gaines, 1990). Moreover, Hollywood adheres to four key strategies that provide 
superior value proposition to consumers: 1) quality product (Bakker, 2003), 2) intensive 
distribution (Puttnam, 1998), 3) promotional power (Silver, 2008), and 4) premium pricing 
(Wasko, 2003). Hollywood rivals tend to be comparatively smaller studios with expertise in 
film production rather than in distribution and marketing (Silver, 2008). These marketing, 
distribution, and promotional initiatives ensure that Hollywood studios have superior 
capabilities over rivals.  
Since 1910, Hollywood has adopted a strategy of product differentiation over 
competitors (Bakker, 2003). Differentiation is achieved by higher budgets and a commitment 
to a quality-based production strategy with a structured new-product-development process 
that is customer oriented (Crabb, 2005). In particular, investment by Hollywood studios in 
script development significantly exceeds competitors (Silver, 2008). While Hollywood films 
have been accused of being overly formula driven, this structured development process has 
ensured that the production of film entertainment has consistently outperformed international 
competitors and has cemented Hollywood’s dominance over the global film market (Sawyer, 
2002). In addition, the distribution and pricing strategy employed by Hollywood studios has 
continually evolved, reflecting the continually escalating price of theatre tickets (Silver, 
2008).  
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Dominant industries also erect barriers to entry to deter potential competitors (Porter, 
1980). Prior to United States v Paramount Pictures Inc (1948), Hollywood studios used 
vertical integration to express its vertical power and to provide them with, “the ability…to 
erect barriers to entry or to otherwise shift costs and revenues among affiliates in ways to 
distort efficient market operation” (Shepherd, 1997, p.2). There is consensus in the 
management and economic literature that barriers to entry play a significant role in 
maintaining market dominance (Stigler, 1968; Porter, 1980; Rosenbaum, 1998). Hay and 
Vickers (1987) note that, “to maintain a dominant position, it is essential to limit the entry 
and growth of rival firms.” The concentration of Hollywood studios creates a barrier to entry 
at three levels. First, only firms of significant size can afford to engage A-list stars (Silver, 
2008). Second, in bringing new films to market, the global scale of operation creates a 
systemic barrier to competitors (Silver, 2008). Third, high production budgets and product 
quality inhibit consumer acceptance of new market entrants (Germain, 2001). 
3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Vertical integration is a key management strategy that has been applied to various 
markets and industries to overcome perceived market imperfections and to enhance firm 
performance (Isaksen et al., 2011). The majority of vertical-integration-to-performance 
studies have been conceptual, with only a few empirical or industry-based studies (Bhuyan, 
2002). Existing ownership-to-performance studies view the subject through the lens of either 
internal or external factors (Rumelt, 1991). Hawawini et al., (2003) report that industry or 
external factors contribute to firm performance in a more direct way than internal firm 
factors, while Opler and Titman (1994) claim that internal factors play a determinant role in 
affecting firm performance. Given the scope of this study, the focus is on internal firm factors 
with reference to the external regulatory environment. Many contemporary theorists in this 
area have found a correlation between ownership structure and firm performance. At a 
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minimum, sound ownership practices ensure that firms are less susceptible to external and 
internal market conditions. For example, Gibbs (1993) notes that corporate ownership is 
positively related to operating performance and business survival; therefore, firms with sound 
ownership structures are better placed to survive economic downturns. 
3.3.1 Hollywood Dominance 
Much of the existing literature which deals with the film industry focuses on the rise 
and dominance of Hollywood. The concept of market dominance “implies power and 
control” (Rosenbaum, 1998). This concept of control forms the key basis both for explaining 
Hollywood’s dominance in the global film and entertainment markets and for the link with 
the concept of ownership-to-performance. In this context, dominance can, on the one hand, 
be explained with reference to Hollywood’s high concentration of ownership coupled with 
size and economic influence, allowing the manipulation of industry pricing (Silver, 2008). On 
the other hand, scholars have theorized that a dominant market share, large economies of 
scale, collusion, cartel-like behavior, high barriers of entry combined with visible brand 
identity are significant indicators of dominant market power (Stigler, 1968; Porter, 1980; 
Rosenbaum, 1998). Moreover, Hollywood’s dominance can also be described as an oligopoly 
in the sense that the market is controlled by a few large firms. Similar oligopoly traits have 
been found in the media and entertainment industry (Silver, 2008). 
Many scholars have sought to utilize and discuss dominance theory, but they seldom 
define it in any unified sense (Singh 2002). Geroski and Jacquemin (1984) attempt to define 
dominance as the ability of a firm to pre-commit itself to a strategic position which narrows 
the range of replies open to rivals. Dominant firms have access to a differential movement 
advantage which can be exploited by making some credible commitment which pre-empts 
rivals, and thus restricts the scope of their activities. 
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 In Georski and Jacquemin (1984)’s definition, it is not the relationship between 
dominance and firm size that is of concern but rather that the reduction of competition is the 
likely consequence of dominant firms creating unfair competitive advantage for themselves. 
On the other hand, economic theorists have attempted to define dominance theory as the 
ability to manipulate pricing to maximize profit (Rosenbaum 1998). While the size of the 
firms is in this case not the defining factor for discussions of market dominance, it can be 
logically deduced that, the larger the firm, the more dominant market position it will have. 
Silver (2008) claims that both the ability of market power to control pricing and output and 
the reduction in competition are apparent in all dominance theories. 
Hollywood has been the dominant leader in the global film business since the end of 
World War One. It has maintained its lead and dominance ever since (Balio, 2002). 
Numerous factors have been expounded to explain Hollywood’s dominance in the global film 
market. These include political, demographic, technological, economic and cultural factors 
(Silver, 2008). While some literature has explained dominance theory with appeal to a single 
factor, most literature in this area proposes a multi-factor cause for the resulting market 
dominance. Waterman and Jayakar (2000) note that scholarly study in this area is multi-
dimensional, owing to “a wide variety of cultural, political, economic and sociological factors 
that contribute to the United States historical dominance of world film trade in motion-
pictures.” 
Hypothesis 1A: There is a positive relationship from being a Hollywood studio and box-
office performance. 
3.3.2 Vertical Integration 
Previous vertical integration studies have yielded mixed results and outcomes. Some 
studies reveal a positive effect on performance (Im and Workman, 2004; Kirca et al., 2005; 
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Gemser et al., 2012) while other studies show either negative or negligible effects on 
performance outcomes (Claessens and Djankov, 1999; Xu and Wang, 1999; Earle et al., 
2005; Al-Matari et al., 2013). Subsequent studies have attempted to explain the inconsistent 
results in two broad ways. First, it has been argued that vertical integration to firm 
performance links varies across different industries; this is popularly known as the “industry 
effect” (Isaksen et al., 2011). Second, different methods of measurement have been used in 
different studies, thereby resulting in diverging results (Isaksen et al., 2011). Theoretically, 
vertical integration should yield performance improvements, since the separation of 
ownership incurs additional administrative and management costs (Kirca et al., 2005). In 
addition, vertical integration promotes economies of scale (Im and Workman, 2004; Walston 
et al., 1996), reduces duplication of services, provides greater coordination of products and 
services, and increases to market share (Shortell, 1988). 
A range of different performance measures have been used to determine the effect of 
ownership structure on performance. Adelman (1955) and Vesey’s (1978 p.11) vertical-
integration measure can be defined as “the ratio of value added to sales, with both numerator 
and denominator adjusted for profits,” or more simply put, value added divided by sales. On 
the other hand, Maddigan (1981) used the VIC index, which relies on national input-output 
tables as a measure of the vertical-integration-to-performance success. Furthermore, Levin 
(1981) introduced the self-sufficiency measure, in which profitability through vertical 
integration is measured by net income plus interest payments divided by total revenue. Other 
theorists such as Harrigan (1986) believe that vertical integration requires a multi-
dimensional measurement whereby distinguishing features such as degree, stages, breadth, 
and form should be identified. Degree of vertical integration was measured by either internal 
purchases (being backward integration) or internal sales (being forward integration). The 
form of the vertical integration was achieved by measuring the percentage of ownership in 
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the venture. Martin (1986) uses an input-output table to measure the average industry of both 
backwards- and forward-integration testing within a structure-conduct-performance model. 
Other theorists include Chatterjee (1991), who measures profitability in vertical integration 
by cumulative abnormal returns (Isaksen et al., 2011). D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) used 
operating revenues over sales as their performance measure. 
Performance measures have included return on investment (Vesey 1978 and Buzzel 
1983), net income and financial costs divided by sales (Levin, 1981), return on asset 
(Maddigan and Zaima, 1985), price cost margin (Martin 1986), operating revenue over total 
sale (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994), excess value (Fan and Lang, 2000), and cumulative 
abnormal return in market value (Chatterjee, 1991). 
Vesey (1978) reports that a high degree of vertical integration does not always 
translate into increased profits but rather that other factors such as the business-operating 
environment and market share are equally determinant. However, Vesey’s study indicates 
that firms that undertake backward integration have better results than forward-integrating 
firms. Buzzel (1983) reports that either very low or very high degrees of vertical integration 
produce the best results. Like Vesey, Buzzel also finds that backward integration produces 
higher return on investment. Levin (1981) claims that profitability is not affected by the 
degree of vertical integration but that vertical integration assists in reducing the variation in 
profits over a period of time (Isaksen et al., 2011). On the other hand, Harrigan (1986) says 
that vertical integration is a costly corporate strategy and that multi-integration stages cannot 
be sustained across the industry’s entire life span whereas Martin (1986) notes that measuring 
vertical integration is a complex exercise depending on whether integration occurs into or out 
of the industry. Martin’s theoretical model is a case-by-case approach; in some instances, 
vertical integration will produce positive results while at other times it does not. Chatterjee 
(1991) reports that vertical integration produces the best results when it leads to increased 
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market power in a concentrated operating market. D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) note that 
vertically integrated firms are more profitable than non-integrated businesses but that vertical 
integration creates higher production costs in the value-chain process. Isaksen et al., (2011) 
identify vertical integration as something that is difficult to measure and compare; they also 
claim that the relationship-to-performance link is ambiguous at best given the 
multidimensional construct of vertical-integration theories. This sentiment is more or less 
emulated by Keats and Hitt (1988 p.526), who conclude that, “performance is a difficult 
concept, both in terms of definitions and measurement.”  
Overall, however, the existing literature suggests that, when specific internal firm 
factors are excluded, vertical integration should theoretically yield positive performance 
improvements. A number of theories have been put forward to support this. These include, 1) 
transaction-costs economics, and 2) industrial-organization economics.  
Transaction-cost economics is one of the central theoretical mechanisms for 
expounding the benefits of a vertically integrated corporate structure. Transaction-cost 
economics can be explained as the organization of transactions which occur in the buying and 
selling process. Secondary considerations may include such things as source selection, 
contract management, performance management, dispute resolution, managing and 
monitoring of personnel, and procuring inputs and capital equipment (Isaksen et al., 2011). In 
its barest form, transaction-cost economics posits that vertical integration eliminates the need 
for inter-firm profits (Mahoney, 1992). In this sense, vertical integration can be seen as a 
focal point whenever the relationship between the buyer and the seller is investigated 
(Hingley, 2001; Spina and Zotteri, 2001). Arrow (1969) explains transaction costs as the cost 
of organizing the economic system, whereas Azzam and Pagoulatos (1999 p.10) go further to 
suggest that “there would be no reason for business firms to exist if…we could foresee the 
future perfectly and there were no costs in negotiating and renegotiating long-term 
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contracts.” Moreover, Levy (1985 p.439) notes that internal transactions undertaken as part 
of a vertical-integration structure is economically profitable so long as the “costs of 
transacting over market outweighs internal costs of management.” 
Industrial-organization economics does not view vertical integration from the 
perspective of reducing inter-firm costs in the value chain. Rather, vertical integration 
instigates a structural reorganization to create a competitive advantage (Isaksen et al., 2011; 
Chatterjee, 1991). Competitive advantage is achieved by utilizing different economies in the 
form of combined operations, internal control and coordination, information management, 
avoiding the market, and stable relationships. Alternately, it is achieved through the reduction 
of external uncertainties and by securing critical supply (Porter, 1980). In its simplest form, 
industrial-organization economics views vertical integration as a mechanism for reducing 
overall firm risk in a trading environment with demand and volume uncertainty, resulting in 
efficiency gains and ultimately in high-performance outcomes (Isaksen et al., 2011). Such 
risks invariably manifest themselves in the day-to-day business-transaction process. Even 
where a contract exists to offset some of the inherent uncertainties which exist in the buying 
and selling process, there is still a disconnect between the interests of each party. Where an 
opportunity benefits one party, it is likely that contractual terms will be interpreted in a 
manner which provides the most benefit to that contracting party. Therefore, an industrial-
organization economics’ view of vertical integration is that it is one of the only tools 
available to businesses to further reduce the inherent uncertainty of mere contracting and to 
align each contracting party’s interests into a single unified business interest. 
Hypothesis 1B: There is a positive relationship between vertical integration and film 
performance. 
3.3.3 Film Performance Through Vertical Integration is Time Dependent 
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The first week and later week cycles are critical indicators of a film’s financial 
success. The most significant period for predicting a film’s box-office success is in its first 
week (Terry et al., 2009). Hollywood films can make up to one-third of their entire domestic 
box-office gross during the opening weekend (Eller and Freidman, 2008). A sub-par opening 
week could mean that a film will struggle to break even. Opening week ticket sales are strong 
predictors of success, as they lay the foundation for international ticket sales and sales to the 
home-entertainment market. In addition, films with low opening-week ticket sales may suffer 
from a perceived lack of value by consumers (Wasko, 2005). Moreover, box-office success in 
its first week of release may impact a film’s theatrical run period, as cinemas will be reluctant 
to run films which perform poorly. Films which make less money at the box-office than 
anticipated will likely have a reduced life-cycle in the cinema (Screen Australia, 2015).  
While first-week performance may indicate box-office success, films which perform 
better later in their life-cycle indicate overall financial success. This is because ticket sales 
represent only a fraction of a film’s potential profit. Previous literature indicates that over 
56% of a film’s total profit may come from non-theater revenue (Terry et al., 2009). In 
addition, given the changing split in revenue between the exhibitors and the studios over the 
life-cycle of the film, the performance of a film later in its cycle may also indicate better 
overall box-office performance (Wasko, 2005). While the focus has been on the opening 
week of new film releases, later week cycles may in fact be a better indicator of a film’s long-
term success (Eller and Freidman, 2008). For example, Avatar remains the highest-grossing 
film of all time with ticket sales just under USD$3 billion. Its performance during the first 
week was only USD$77 million. Increases in the film’s box-office sales did not occur until 
later in the film life-cycle.  
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I therefore theorize that performance improvements through vertical integration are 
time dependent, with the most significant impact during the first week and later week cycles 
of the box-office film-release life cycle. 
Hypothesis 2: The dominance of Hollywood is mitigated by vertically integrated studios; 
mitigation is stronger in the first week post-release and stronger in later weeks. 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
I examine any performance implications stemming from vertical integration by 
comparing films produced by Hollywood studios (not vertically integrated) with Village 
Roadshow and Icon films (vertically integrated) as the empirical setting. A set of multivariate 
regressions is employed to establish and understand links between ownership integration and 
performance.  
3.4.1 Data Collection 
The sample comprises data for films produced through both vertically integrated and 
non-vertically integrated studios. Two major Australian studios have integrated value chains 
to produce major blockbusters: Village Roadshow and Icon/Dendy. Much of the data was 
collected through IMDB (www.imdb.com). However, I also utilized Box Office Mojo 
(www.boxofficemojo.com) and The Numbers (www.the-numbers.com) for supplementary 
data where IMDB data was not available. Furthermore, additional Australian film data was 
provided by the Motion Picture Distributor’s Association of Australia (www.mpdaa.org.au).  
The data includes a total of 146 films comprising half vertically integrated and half 
non-integrated films. This comprises 69 vertically integrated films by Village and 4 vertically 
integrated films by Icon. The sample includes all films produced by Village Roadshow and 
Icon from 1992 to 2015. Village and Icon films were identified through IMDB. I match each 
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Village Roadshow and Icon film with a non-integrated film produced by a Hollywood studio 
that matches with respect to year, genre, and budget according to IMDB. Given the wide 
breadth of available genres, I confined it to the most popular genres being drama, romance, 
action, family, and comedy. I identified the matching non-integrated films by undertaking 
Google searches for terms such as action films in 2014, where the integrated film was of an 
action genre released in 2014. By using IMDB, Box Office Mojo and The Numbers, I 
confirmed the viability of films generated through the Google search by ensuring that the film 
matched with respect to year, genre, and budget. Films were excluded in case of non-
availability of data and/or missing data. IMDB was also utilized to identify budgets, films 
with Australian shooting locations, and Australian actors. Moreover, IMDB also allowed for 
the identification of films directed by IMDB top 100 directors and films nominated for either 
the AACTA Best Picture Award or OSCAR Best Picture Award. Furthermore, weekly screen 
and box-office data was provided by the Motion Picture Distributor’s Association of 
Australia. 
3.4.2 Variables 
The variables employed in the multiple regression equations are described in Table 
3.1 and discussed below. 
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Table 3.1: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Dependent Variable 
Box Office The film’s cumulative global box office performance 
Independent Variable 
Integ Whether the film was produced, distributed and 
exhibited by an integrated studio or non-integrated 
studio 
Control 
Sequel Whether the film is part of a sequel of films 
Budget The cost of film production 
IMDB Sco The film aggregate score as provided by users of IMDB 
Drama Films classified as being in the drama genre by IMDB 
Romance Films classified as being in the romance genre by 
IMDB 
Comedy Films classified as being in the comedy genre by IMDB 
Action Films classified as being in the action genre by IMDB 
Family Films classified as being in the family genre by IMDB 
Sci Fi Films classified as being in the science fiction genre by 
IMDB 
AUS Loct Films that were wholly or partly filmed in Australia 
AUS Act Films containing Australian actors 
AUS Star Films containing Australian actors in IMDB’s list of 
top 60 Australian actors 
Scr WK 1 Number of Australian cinema screens exhibiting the 
film in Week 1 
Scr WK 2 Number of Australian cinema screens exhibiting the 
film in Week 2 
Scr WK 3 Number of Australian cinema screens exhibiting the 
film in Week 3 
Scr WK 4 Number of Australian cinema screens exhibiting the 
film in Week 4 
Scr WK 5 Number of Australian cinema screens exhibiting the 
film in Week 5 
Scr WK 6 Number of Australian cinema screens exhibiting the 
film in Week 6 
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 Table 3.1 shows the variables used for the regression. The dependent variable is the 
film’s cumulative box office performance. The independent variable is whether the film was 
conceived through a vertically integrated channel for bringing the film to market. If the film 
is vertically integrated, it’s labelled 1. If the film is not vertically integrated, the film is 
labelled 0. In the regression, I control for any sequel effect, film budget, IMDB score, film 
genre, and the number of weekly screens in the partial model. In the full model, I also control 
for Australian characteristics (including Australian actors, shooting location and stars) in 
addition to the controls used in the partial model.  
3.5 RESULTS 
The hypotheses are tested using six regression analyses corresponding to each week 
of the sampled film’s box-office life cycle. Before the results are discussed, Table 3.2 shows 
the means, standard deviations, and correlations between the key independent variables. 
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Table 3.2: Correlation Table to Establish Link between Vertical Integration and Film Performance 
 
No Variable Mean Std Dev. N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Integ .500 .502 148                   
2 Sequel .095 .294 148 .000                  
3 IMDB Sc. 6.537 1.050 148 -.273** .176*                 
4 Budget 5.52E+7 3.64E+7 148 -.004 .625** .197**                
5 Drama .426 .496 148 -.096 -.232** .261** -.207**               
6 Romance .196 .398 148 -.017 -.160* .012 -.264** .264**              
7 Comedy .345 .477 148 .043 -.089 -.235** -.180* -.222** .287**             
8 Action .351 .479 148 -.057 .294** -.004 .350** -.290** -.363** -.146*            
9 Family .074 .263 148 .026 .172* -.195** .125 -.140* -.140* .174* -.101           
10 Sci-Fi .115 .320 148 -.064 .246** .080 .341** -.224** -.178* -.217** .268** -.102          
11 AUS Loct .122 .328 148 .248** .162* .010 .036 -.111 -.080 -.139* .029 -.027 .190* -.032 .065 -.007 .004     
12 AUS Act .338 .475 148 .114 .160* .092 .268** -.037 -.137* -.127 .073 .124 .101 .169* -.031 .017 .059 .477**    
13 AUS Star .122 .328 148 .124 .304** .198** .231** -.069 -.027 -.139* .029 .052 .255** .152* .065 .043 .046 .557** .521**   
 
***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.2 shows that all the correlations are below r = 0.6, which indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a major concern.  
The regression results encompassing weeks 1 to 6 of the sampled film’s cinema box-
office life cycle are presented in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3: Regression Results to Establish Link between Vertical Integration and Film Performance 
 
 Week 1  Week 2  Week 3 
 Partial Model Full Model  Partial Model Full Model  Partial Model Full Model 
 Est. T-Val. Est. T-Val.  Est. T-Val. Est. T-Val.  Est. T-Val. Est. T-Val. 
Intercept  -1.374*  -1.765** Intercept  -1.148  -1.398* Intercept  1.170  1.152 
Integ .001 .007 .025 .325 Integ -.123 -1.784** -.109 -1.558* Integ -.188 -1.754** -.164 -1.474* 
Sequel .364 3.934*** .391 4.114*** Sequel .219 2.563*** .223 2.518*** Sequel .405 2.997*** .420 2.948*** 
IMDB Sc .107 1.380* .136 1.765** IMDB Sc .055 .738 .071 .953 IMDB Sc -.108 -.883 -.106 -.842 
Budget .404 4.315*** .409 4.195*** Budget .25 .244 .051 .488 Budget -.249 -1.610* -.258 -1.587* 
Drama -.003 -.037 -.012 -.160 Drama -.036 -.505 -.025 -.351 Drama -.038 -.340 -.034 -.295 
Romance .171 2.042** .192 2.308** Romance .085 1.113 .094 1.222 Romance -.002 -.013 -.009 -.074 
Comedy .034 .433 .040 .501 Comedy -.041 -.553 -.044 -.580 Comedy -.108 -.902 -.134 -1.074 
Action .178 2.078** .175 2.054** Action -.006 -.076 .003 .035 Action -.002 -.019 -.012 -.097 
Family -.051 -.640 -.042 -.529 Family .152 2.076** .179 2.428*** Family -.027 -.240 -.009 -.075 
Sci-Fi .073 .981 .113 1.490* Sci-Fi -.010 -.137 -.005 -.067 Sci-Fi -.147 -1.362* -.138 -1.240 
Scr WK 1 .019 .272 .015 .220 Scr WK 2 .593 5.979*** .608 6.060*** Scr WK 3 3.30 2.096** .360 2.196** 
AUS Loct   .080 .866 AUS Loct   .103 1.149 AUS Loct   -.021 -.149 
AUS Act   .046 .522 AUS Act   -.089 -1.089 AUS Act   -.088 -.679 
AUS Star   -.225 -2.379*** AUS Star   -.128 -1.452* AUS Star   -.047 -.329 
R2 .620  0.645  R2 .685  .703  R2 .239  .255  
F 12.926***  10.914***  F 17.039***  14.048***  F 2.432**  2.003**  
 
***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Regression Results to Establish Link between Vertical Integration and Film Performance (Continued) 
 
 Week 4  Week 5  Week 6 
 Partial Model Full Model  Partial Model Full Model  Partial Model Full Model 
 Est. T-Val. Est. T-Val.  Est. T-Val. Est. T-Val.  Est. T-Val. Est. T-Val. 
Intercept  -1.113  -1.366* Intercept  -.680  -.786 Intercept  -1.624*  -1.605* 
Integ -.066 -.940 -.056 -.793 Integ .000 .007 .005 .080 Integ .044 .651 .047 .657 
Sequel .071 .792 .076 .820 Sequel -.048 -.601 -.044 -.525 Sequel -.008 -.094 -.013 -.145 
IMDB Sc .055 .686 .073 .895 IMDB Sc .030 .417 .038 .515 IMDB Sc .134 1.750** .136 1.725** 
Budget -.085 -.842 -.045 -.428 Budget -.154 -1.829** -.134 -1.512* Budget -.130 -1.472* -.111 -1.187 
Drama -.017 -.241 -.004 -.056 Drama -.043 -.656 -.035 -.529 Drama -.069 -.973 -.060 -.821 
Romance -.009 -.108 .008 .096 Romance -.081 -1.117 -.074 -.996 Romance -.120 -1.523* -.119 -1.473* 
Comedy -.022 -.273 -.017 -.204 Comedy -.101 -1.364* -.098 -1.284 Comedy -.035 -.450 -.036 -.488 
Action -.034 -.423 -.021 -.260 Action -.057 -.774 -.051 -.685 Action -.099 -1.246 -.094 -1.152 
Family .187 2.521*** .211 2.813*** Family .222 3.342*** .235 3.432*** Family .064 .871 .077 1.008 
Sci-Fi -.029 -.421 -.023 -.324 Sci-Fi -.022 -.338 -.017 -.250 Sci-Fi -.047 -.670 -.046 -.629 
Scr WK 4 .764 7.143*** .757 7.013*** Scr WK 5 .918 10.484*** .911 10.179*** Scr WK 6 .854 10.008*** .852 9.764*** 
AUS Loct   .106 1.189 AUS Loct   .054 .663 AUS Loct   .037 .421 
AUS Act   -.062 -.766 AUS Act   -.035 -.481 AUS Act   -.052 -.659 
AUS Star   -.136 -1.499* AUS Star   -.071 -.831 AUS Star   -.027 -.289 
R2 .701  .716  R2 .771  .775  R2 .739  .741  
F 17.083***  13.884***  F 23.573***  18.231***  F 19.013***  14.534***  
 
***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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The F-statistics of the partial and full models are significant in both regressions and 
all regressions explain significant variance in performance in all weeks (p<0.01).  
Hollywood studios are non-integrated, and the integration coefficient is not significant 
and close to β = 0 for Week 1 (β = 0.001 and t = 0.007), Week 4 (β = -0.066 and t = -0.940), 
Week 5 (β = 0 and t = 0.007), and Week 6 (β = 0.044 and t = 0.651). The integration 
coefficient is significant for Week 2 exhibiting β = -0.123 and t = -1.784 in the partial model 
and β = -0.109 and t = -1.558 in the full model and Week 3 with β = -0.188 and t = -1.754 for 
the partial model and β = -0.164 and t = -1.474 for the full model. This indicates that 
Hollywood studios outperform vertically integrated studios in the middle of the box-office 
release life cycle; thus, Hypothesis 1A and 1B can both not be rejected.  
The results suggest that the most important predictors of box-office performance in a 
specific week are the number of cinema screens, which exhibit the film and whether the film 
is part of a sequel. The results also indicate that Hypothesis 1B is not supported given that the 
weekly integration variables in Table 4 are not significant and positive in any of the sampled 
six-week post-release periods.  
Hypothesis 2 describes the expectation that there is an inverted, U-shaped pattern in 
the regression coefficients across the sampled weeks. The coefficients are close to β = 0 at the 
start and after 4 weeks with a significant negative drop in coefficients in Week 2 and Week 3. 
This supports Hypothesis 2, albeit the pattern is weak and the integration advantage seems 
unable to overcome the dominance that Hollywood studios experience – even in an overseas 
market like Australia.  
In the full model, a two-step approach was taken with Australian shooting location, 
Australian actors, and Australian top stars according to IMDB to assess the mediation of local 
content in the film that affects the relationship between vertical integration and box-office 
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performance. The results are generally upheld and show that the negative integration 
coefficients become somewhat smaller in Step 2 encompassing Week 2 and Week 3. 
Specifically, the coefficients drop from β = -0.123 to β = -0.109 in Week 2 and β = -0.188 
becomes β = -0.164 in Week 3, thereby indicating that Australian integrated studios would 
perform worse at the Australian box-office if the films had not included any Australian 
locations, Australian actors, and/or Australian stars. Notwithstanding this, Hollywood still 
has an overall box-office performance advantage in the middle of the film’s cinema box-
office life cycle. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This article has investigated whether the performance at the box-office differs for 
films produced by non-constrained studios in Australia compared with constrained 
Hollywood studios. The results indicate that it does differ during certain periods of the film’s 
box-office life cycle. I find that Hollywood films invariably exhibit superior performance at 
the box-office due to Hollywood's dominance over the global film market. However, the 
analysis indicates that comparable films produced through vertical integration mitigates 
Hollywood’s dominance during the first week post-release and in later weeks of the film’s 
box-office life cycle. These results are both statistically and economically significant. While 
there is weaker evidence of improved performance outcomes during the middle of the film’s 
box-office life cycle, this period is not a significant indicator of a film’s overall success. By 
and large, the findings are consistent with the view that integration improves a firm’s ability 
to manage external costs and risk factors. 
The findings suggest that Hollywood continues to dominate the global film market 
through its marketing, distribution, and promotional capability, superior product development 
and pricing capability, and high barriers to entry. In addition, the continuous exploitation of 
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intellectual property through its sequel strategy means that constrained Hollywood studios 
retain a competitive advantage over studios unconstrained by regulation. This significant 
global competitive advantage cannot simply be overcome merely by vertically integrated 
studios bringing new films to the market. 
Consequently, I did not find a positive relationship between vertical integration and 
film performance that offsets Hollywood’s dominance of the global film industry. Rather, the 
finding suggests that the effect of vertical integration on box-office performance is more 
subtle. I find that vertical integration mitigates certain disadvantages of not being a 
Hollywood studio during critical periods of a film’s box-office life cycle. This results in 
improved box-office performance of vertically integrated films during the first and later 
weeks of a film’s box-office life cycle.  
The improved results for vertically integrated films appear to be a consequence of the 
un-constrained studio’s better attunement to the local film market and consumers, which 
results in superior screen strategies at the box-office. Therefore, vertical integration allows 
non-constrained studios to use localized capabilities to develop better greenlighting, 
development, and release strategies for bringing new films to the market, thereby offsetting 
some of the inherent superiority of films produced by constrained Hollywood studios. 
This article reveals numerous implications for both academic and theoretical 
development plus implications for managers and firms in the film and, more broadly, the 
global creative industry. The emergence of online streaming platforms and new global 
players in film from developing economies (most notably China) and their investments in 
developed countries are changing the global film-industry landscape. These vertically 
integrated firms compete for the same consumer base as traditional Hollywood studios which 
even today remain non-integrated as a result of the United States v Paramount Pictures Inc 
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(1948) decision. In this study, I examined a phenomenon that remains under-theorized: how 
does vertical integration affect film box-office performance? More specifically, I build on 
existing ownership-to-performance theories with context and industry-specific application. 
Given the wide range in performance outcomes from existing ownership-to-performance 
studies, I show that different types of industries may lead to different types of learnings and 
capabilities and may in turn influence different performance outcomes. I developed and 
tested a framework about the performance of films produced through vertical integration 
versus comparable films produced through non-integration. The conceptualization highlights 
not only the need to consider the effect of vertical integration upon box-office performance, 
but also Hollywood’s dominance in the global film market.  
Overall, the analysis suggests that the ownership-to-performance relationship is 
heavily dependent on industrial policy, as both internal and external factors may impact the 
resulting performance outcomes.  
The results have several implications for practice in the motion-picture industry and 
possibly beyond. First, this article aims to help managers in the film and creative industry 
make better integration decisions regarding, for example when to vertically integrate; when 
not to integrate; and when to use alternative, quasi-integration strategies. While this study is 
focused on the film industry, the analysis suggests that vertical integration may be an 
effective, long-term strategy to improve firm performance where, 1) the market is risky and 
unstable, 2) firms in adjacent stages of the industry value chain have greater market power, 3) 
integration would create or exploit market power by raising barriers to entry or by allowing 
price discrimination across customer segments, and 4) where it is a new market and firms 
need to forward integrate to develop the new market value chain for bring products to market. 
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Second, in the competitive landscape of film, a firm’s competitive advantage may be eroded 
by imitation and technological innovation. Vertical integration may be used as a strategy to 
seize opportunities and to extend existing capabilities in order to cope with the competitive 
environment. Through vertical integration, firms are able to quickly assimilate new and 
reconfigure existing knowledge across organizational boundaries within the firm to develop 
flexible and less rigid capabilities. While vertical integration may result in increased cost in 
the short term, the continuous change in industrial environment requires firms to constantly 
create new capabilities rather than merely extend current core capabilities. The results 
suggest that studios use vertical integration as a way to proactively compete with legacy 
Hollywood studios and to mitigate the performance advantage of being a Hollywood studio at 
critical periods during the film’s exhibition life cycle. 
This study places vertical integration strategy in the context of the competitive 
landscape of the film industry, with stress on knowledge development. After vertical 
integration, the results reveal improved performance during the first week and later week 
cycles, which are the most important periods of a film’s box-office life cycle. Since box-
office revenue accounts for only a portion of a film’s possible total profit, improved 
performance at these critical junctures during the exhibition stage may be indicative of strong 
sales in the home-entertainment market and subsequent secondary revenue sources.  
This study offers various avenues for future research. Vertical integration as an 
organizational strategy is used as the primary tool for alleviating transaction costs associated 
with the business exchange process. This sentiment is relevant and applicable to global film 
industry. Existing studies have shown that while vertical integration yields many benefits, 
performance outcomes are not free from internal (inherent and projected costs and risks 
associated with the integration process) and external (regulatory prohibition) factors.  
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This article has attempted to examine the performance outcomes in box-office performance 
which stem from vertical integration of film studios in both Hollywood and other vertically 
integrated jurisdictions. Performance of films at the box-office forms only a portion of the 
total cost-benefit analysis associated with vertical integration. The market-mitigating 
mechanism of vertical integration practiced by firms in the global film industry, as explained 
in this article, will invariably pose its own risks, set-up costs, and operating costs associated 
with maintaining a vertically integrated firm structure. Future research endeavor in this light 
may work toward examining the potential risk and cost associated with vertical integration 
strategies and the performance of any secondary revenue (subsequent TV deals, merchandise 
and home entertainment) resulting from films produced via a vertically integrated model in 
an attempt to develop a more comprehensive costs-benefits framework.  
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4. STRATEGIC-INTENT OF CHINESE ACQUISITIONS IN WESTERN 
CULTURAL INDUSTRIES: A MIXED METHOD STUDY OF DALIAN 
WANDA 
Abstract 
This article examines the strategic-intent of foreign acquisitions made by Chinese firms in 
Western cinemas. In particular, I focus on acquisitions by the Chinese conglomerate, Dalian 
Wanda (“Wanda”), in the film industry. The article examines alternative theories and 
explores propositions based primarily on business, financial and political motivations in 
Wanda’s takeover behavior. In-depth inductive analysis through a mixed method approach 
encompassing three unique studies are used to triangulate key motivators for Wanda’s foreign 
acquisition behavior. The study finds support for both types of intent. This study shows that 
there are clear interconnections between the two types of intent and that these connections 
may be more or less direct. This article contributes to existing theories regarding the links 
between ownership and performance and the impact of strategy process and strategy practice 
research by incorporating strategic-intent to examine the globalization strategy of Wanda.  
Keywords: foreign acquisition, Dalian Wanda, strategic-intent, global cinema industry.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Strategic-intent theory is among the most influential conceptual paradigms for 
understanding corporate strategy formulation (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Mantere and 
Silince, 2007). Its venerable roots can be traced back to describe the rapid post-war growth of 
Japanese and Korean firms (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). These firms pursued a relentless 
long-term growth strategy to achieve a chosen strategic objective (Rui and Yip, 2008). 
Strategic-intent is unique in that it provides long-term stability while making room for new 
and emerging opportunities (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). 
Strategic-intent’s explanatory value has been felt in such diverse areas as strategic 
planning (Mintzberg, 1994), foreign acquisitions (Rui and Yip, 2008), corporate symbolism 
(Hart and Banbury, 1994), organizational culture (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985), and 
management legitimacy (Noda and Bower, 1996).  
Existing studies have focused on business and financial motives in explaining 
strategic-intent (Hart, 1992; Hart and Banbury, 1994). However, recent literature has hinted 
that strategic-intent may include motives beyond the purely business and financial (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008; Gemser et al., 2012; Cui, Meyer and Hu, 2014; O’Shannassy, 2016). For 
example, Dunning and Lundan (2008) discuss the importance of political considerations in 
corporate strategy formulation for Chinese firms. 
Research on strategic-intent thus has further scope for development. For instance, 
there are diverging views on who ultimately drives strategic-intent within an organization: 
whether is the CEO (Green, 1988) or senior management (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Rui and 
Yip, 2008). Likewise, strategic-intent has so far primarily focused on business and financial 
outcomes as measures of success (O’Shannassy, 2016). There are only limited theoretical and 
empirical studies which look beyond purely business or financial intent (e.g., Hart, 1992; 
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Hart and Banbury, 1994). Moreover, in-depth empirical strategic-intent studies as seen in 
Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) and Rui and Yip (2008) are rare; most studies are of a purely 
theoretical nature (e.g., Hamel and Prahalad, 1989; and Liedtka, 1998).  
In this study, I seek to determine whether Western acquisitions made by Wanda in the 
cinema industry are based on business and financial intent or based on political intent. The 
goal of this article is to identify alternative strategic-intent theories and test hypotheses based 
not only on business and financial intent but also on political intent for globalization 
strategies of firms from emerging economies.  
I propose an in-depth mixed methods study examining strategic-intent from a unique 
perspective. Mixed methods support the article’s methodological rigor (Molina-Azorin et al., 
2017) by: 1) balancing the needs of exploration with analysis (Liu and Woywode, 2013; 
Williamson, 2016); 2) providing a broader perspective of the overall issue (Rizvi, 2010); 3) 
mitigating the effects of personal bias (Jick, 1983; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010); and 4) providing greater depth and variety of data sources 
(Denzin, 1978; Creswell and Creswell, 2017).  I concentrate on the cultural industry because 
of the national significance and political sensitivity it exhibits through its ability to influence 
culture, values, and viewpoints. It may be an important tool for expanding national influence. 
This article focuses on the Chinese conglomerate Wanda, which has made numerous high-
profile acquisitions of Western cinema and film assets. 
4.1.1 Cultural Industries 
The cultural industry is unique in that it may serve both a corporate and political 
purpose (Fligstein, 1996). On the one hand, the cultural industry is a growing industry, 
contributing some $2.25 trillion or 3% of global GDP and creating over 29.5 million jobs 
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(EY, 2015). On the other hand, cultural industries can be used as strategic tools for exerting 
national influence (Keane, 2005).  
The United States is the dominant global exporter of popular culture. American 
cultural values exert strong influence worldwide (Vlassis, 2015). In 2013, the cultural 
industry in the United States generated $620 billion and 4.7 million jobs (EY, 2015). 
However, in recent years, the Chinese cultural industries have grown significantly (Keane, 
2005). A major sub-sector within the cultural industry is film, which are the focus of this 
article. China is already the most important film market outside the United States. By 2020, it 
is expected that China will overtake the United States as the largest film market globally 
(Kokas, 2013). There is growing recognition within the Chinese Government that Chinese 
cultural industries may be a vehicle for exporting a positive Chinese narrative globally 
(Vlassis, 2015). Recent foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms in Western cultural industries 
may evince the fulfilment of this vision. If this is the case, the strategic-intent of these 
acquisitions may not be driven purely by business or financial motivations but may also be 
driven with political intent.  
4.1.2 The Wanda Factor 
Wanda is China’s largest conglomerate operating in the cultural industry. Founded in 
1988 by Wang Jianlin (“Wang”), Wanda has made a number of high-profile Western 
acquisitions in the cultural industry. In 2012, Wanda made its first investment outside China 
with its acquisition of AMC Theaters (“AMC”) for USD$2.6 billion. The acquisition made 
Wanda the world’s largest cinema operator, a title which it still retains today, with over 6% 
and 13% of all cinema screens in China and the United States, respectively. In 2015, Wanda 
also acquired the Australian cinema Hoyts, and in 2016, it acquired Legendary Studio 
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(“Legendary”) and Carmike Cinemas in the U.S. and Odeon and UCI Cinemas Group in 
Europe. Table 4.1 lists all of Wanda’s completed foreign acquisitions in the film industry. 
Table 4.1: Wanda’s Completed Foreign Acquisition in the Film Industry 
YEAR FIRM INDUSTRY REGION VALUE ($USD) 
2012 AMC Cinema United States $2.6 billion 
2015 Hoyts Group Cinema Australia and 
New Zealand 
$336 million 
2016 Legendary 
Entertainment 
Film Studio United States $3.5 billion 
2016 Propaganda GEM Film Marketing United States Not published 
2016 Carmike Cinemas Inc Cinema United States $1.1 billion 
2016 Odeon and UCI 
Cinemas Group 
Cinema Europe $1.2 billion 
 
In addition, Wanda has embarked on various joint ventures (including taking a 
minority stake in Sony Pictures for several upcoming film releases).  
4.2 STRATEGIC-INTENT: FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSITION 
The core of the rational normative model for strategic-intent states that strategic 
objectives are developed through analysis of a firm’s internal and external environments. 
These strategic objectives are then turned into strategy and deliberately implemented 
(Andrews, 1971). Table 4.2 below provides a summary of representative strategic-intent 
studies.
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Table 4.2: Representative Strategic-Intent Studies 
Author Year Region Industry Strategic Focus Method Conclusion 
O’Shannassy 2016 N/A N/A Strategic-intent in 
forming corporate 
strategy 
Theoretical Strong performing firms often have intents that state 
their ambitions for the future, which is communicated to 
stakeholders via the CEO. 
Chen, Liu, 
Ni and Wu 
2015 Taiwan Engineering International 
expansion 
informed by 
strategic-intent 
Experimental 
design method 
The strategic-intent perspective is the 
most influential factor in international expansion. The 
rational analyses of the strategic-intent perspective and 
market positions affect a firm's international expansion 
strategy. 
Cui, Meyer 
and Hu 
2014 China Various industries Foreign investment 
decisions are 
strategic actions. 
Questionnaire Strategic asset seeking is a critical action used to 
accelerate competitive catch-up with global leaders. 
Maridoss, 
Johnson and 
Martin 
2014 United States Manufacturing Strategic-intent and 
performance 
Combined 
qualitative and 
cross-sectional 
quantitative 
study 
“Strategic-intent can serve as an anchoring 
mechanism that drives and guides a firm's subsequent 
resource-allocation decisions.” 
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Kaplan and 
Orlikowski 
2013 United States Communication 
manufacturing 
Temporal work in 
strategy 
formulation 
Multiple-case-
study 
Temporal work in strategic decision making reduces risk 
of competency traps from the past – particularly in 
diminished business conditions. 
Deng 2009 China Consumer electronic Strategic-intent in 
addressing 
competitive 
disadvantage 
Multiple-case-
study 
The strategic-intent of Chinese firms which use cross-
border merger and acquisition is to access and source 
strategic assets so as to address their competitive 
disadvantage. 
Rui and Yip 2008 China Information 
technology, 
telecommunication, 
and vehicle 
manufacturing 
Strategic-intent in 
Chinese foreign 
acquisitions 
Multiple-case-
study 
Strategic-intent is derived from top management. Long-
term objectives are a source for inspiration to focus firm-
wide resources. 
Kaplan 2008 United States Communication 
manufacturing 
Framing contests in 
forming strategy 
Case-study Strategic-intent is not only driven from top management 
but framed by all strategy actors through a dynamic and 
political process. 
Dunning and 
Lundan 
2008 N/A N/A Strategic-intent 
from the 
perspective of 
institutional 
analysis 
Theoretical Strategic-intent promotes economic efficiency, growth, 
and social wellbeing. 
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Deng 2007 China Consumer electronic Strategic-intent is 
driven by resource 
constraints in the 
home country. 
Multiple-case-
study 
To understand the strategic-intent of mergers and 
acquisitions by Chinese conglomerates, there is a need to 
better understand the institutional environment in which 
they are embedded. 
Mantere and 
Sillince 
2007 N/A N/A Strategic-intent as a 
rhetorical device 
Literature 
study 
“Strategic-intent represents a proactive mode in 
strategizing, a symbol of the organization’s will about 
the future, which energizes all organizational levels for a 
collective purpose.” 
Burgelman 2002 United States Semi-conductor 
memory 
Strategy as vectors 
for long-term 
organizational 
adaptation 
Comparative 
longitudinal 
study 
There is a limit to the CEO’s ability to frame a firm’s 
strategic-intent. 
Lovas and 
Ghoshal 
2000 Denmark Hearing-aids Corporate 
evolution guided 
by strategic-intent 
Case-study Strategic-intent relates to a firm’s long-term objectives. 
Statement of objectives articulated by top management. 
Liedtka 1998 United States Information 
technology 
Strategic thinking Theoretical Strategic-intent helps focus the firm’s overall strategic 
thinking. 
Mintzberg 1994 N/A N/A Role of strategic-
intent in strategy 
making 
Literature 
study 
Vision plays an important role in strategy making. 
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Hart and 
Banbury 
1994 Japan and 
Korea 
Consumer 
electronics 
Strategic-intent in 
strategy 
formulation 
Questionnaire Symbolisms are strong predictors of strategic-intent 
performance. 
Hamel and 
Prahalad 
1994 Japan, United 
States, and 
the United 
Kingdom 
Information 
technology 
Future focused 
competition 
Literature 
study 
Strategic-intent is an organizational dream, emotion, and 
distillation of strategy, objective, and mission to 
succeed. “Strategic-intent … conveys … a sense of 
direction … sense of discovery … it implies a sense of 
destiny.” 
Hart 1992 United States 
and Europe 
N/A Strategic-intent in 
formulating 
corporate strategy 
Theoretical To have buy-in to a firm’s strategic-intent, it must be 
appealing and symbolic. 
Prahalad and 
Hamel 
1990 Japan and 
United States 
Information 
technology 
Strategic-intent as a 
firm’s core 
competency 
Theoretical A firm’s strategic architecture is a roadmap for the 
future. Therefore, strategic-intent as a firm’s core 
competency is a valuable firm-wide resource. 
Hamel and 
Prahalad 
1989 Japan and 
Korea 
Construction Strategic-intent Theoretical Strategic-intent is a shared obsession to succeed. It 
focuses a firm’s long-term objectives and resources on 
one single objective: to win. 
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The resource-based view further develops the concept of rational analysis by 
providing commentary on a firm’s internal strengths and weakness, which influence the 
objectives that firms will pursue (Huff and Reger, 1987). The resource-based view regards 
internal capabilities as the primary determinant of a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). While this may be true for firms which operate in a free-market environment, firms 
from developing nations also need to contend with external factors which may be just as 
important as internal capabilities. For example, Hitt and Tyler (1991) propose that strategic-
intent is influenced by both internal and external factors, which may include political 
interference in internal firm decisions. I build the framework upon this integrated approach 
by incorporating two key elements in the model: 1) political intent, and 2) business and 
financial intent. Given that strategic-intent may have multiple purposes (Sun, 2010), this 
article seeks to provide a hierarchical strategic-intent order. A series of research propositions 
are developed to reflect this model. 
4.2.1 Political Intent 
The Chinese Government plays a significant role in shaping the foreign acquisition 
behavior of Chinese firms (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). As Deng (2004) noted, “[the] 
Chinese Government has, to a great extent, played a crucial role in shaping the structure of 
China’s approved outward investment.” Even with the gradual liberalization of the economy, 
China is still a state-controlled political economy in which the Government plays an active 
role in transactions and performance (Deng, 2004). On the one hand, the Government informs 
formal regulations and policy at the national and provincial levels (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). On the other hand, more informal institutional frameworks – such as firm-government 
relationships, political connections, and other informal networks (known as Guanxi) – play a 
leading role in shaping the business behavior of private Chinese firms (Peng and Heath, 
1996).  
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Previous studies have shown that Chinese firms can conduct successful foreign 
acquisitions due to their ability to leverage country-specific advantages (Sun, 2010). These 
country-specific advantages are informed by government policy and support (Sun, 2010). 
Other theories posit that nationalism and pride may inform both the target firm and location 
choice for foreign acquisitions made by large Chinese conglomerates: Hope, Thomas, and 
Vyas (2011) suggest that the ability of Chinese firms to acquire leading Western firms is a 
source of national pride which allows for the spread of Chinese soft power through economic 
dominance.  
Proposition 1: Foreign acquisitions by Wanda in the film industry are driven by political 
intent. 
4.2.2 Business and Financial Intent 
Internal business and financial strength forms an important prerequisite for a firm’s 
internationalization success (Barley, 1991). Strategic-intent using rational analysis has shown 
that firms cannot fully globalize until they can utilize their substantial competitive advantages 
in a foreign market (Andrews, 1971). The rational-analysis model further posits that, prior to 
undertaking foreign acquisitions, senior management will develop strategies by conducting 
market analyses on both internal and external factors (Huff and Reger, 1987). Strategic 
decision-making, therefore, is sequential, logical, and driven primarily by business-efficacy 
considerations (Huff and Reger, 1987). The resource-based theory regards a firm’s firm-
specific resources as the prime determinant of its competitive advantage (Barley, 1991).  
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) define a firm’s strategic firm-specific resources and 
capabilities as “the set of difficult-to-trade-and-imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized 
resources and capabilities”, which they argue directly contributes to the firm’s future growth 
and long-term financial viability. Firms often find that, beyond a certain size, they are 
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constrained in their ability to develop new and novel resources and capabilities in their home 
country (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These firms also face challenges in acquiring specific 
resources and capabilities on the open market as a single entity. This forces firms to 
undertake foreign acquisitions as a means of rebalancing domestic competitiveness 
(Homburg and Bucerius, 2005).  
Compared to many Western conglomerates which have been operating globally for 
over a century, Chinese conglomerates are latecomers. Ordinarily, these firms would control 
much less in the way of firm-specific resources than their respective Western counterparts 
(Rui and Yip, 2008; and Deng, 2007). Therefore, in order for Chinese conglomerates to 
compete effectively in a global setting, they need to quickly acquire strategic resources which 
match or exceed the level of the strategic resources of their Western competition (Homburg 
and Bucerius, 2005). Foreign acquisition represents an efficient and effective method of 
acquiring these strategic resources when the home country lacks the expertise for effective 
resource generation (Hitt et al., 2001).  
Proposition 2: Foreign acquisitions by Wanda in the film industry are driven by business and 
financial intent. 
4.3 METHODS 
Researchers have called for rigorous inductive studies examining strategic-intent as a 
motivation for the internationalization strategy of firms from emerging economies (Deng, 
2009; Rui and Yip, 2008; Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). For this article, I carried out three in-
depth, inductive studies using both qualitative and quantitative data to explore and triangulate 
the propositions (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Several previous studies have examined 
foreign-acquisition activities using a mixed-methods approach (Rizvi, 2010; Liu and 
Woywode, 2013; Williamson, 2016). Studies using a mixed-methods approach to explore and 
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triangulate key themes have found the following: First, triangulation using mixed methods 
produces deeper insights than single-method studies do (Denzin, 1978; Creswell and 
Creswell, 2017). Second, methodological integration employed in examining the same 
phenomena can provide a more “complete, holistic and contextual portrayal of the subject 
under study” (Rizvi, 2010). Third, weaknesses and limitations in individual methods can be 
counterbalanced and mitigated (Jick, 1983; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 2010). Finally, utilizing a mixed-methods approach “can provide the necessary 
empirical intricacy and rigor to match the complexities of organizational phenomena” 
(Molina-Azorin et al., 2017 p. 179). 
 In the first study, I induct intent using qualitative data. Qualitative data is widely used 
in the study of media and cultural industries (Altheide and Schneider, 2013). In this article, 
qualitative data plays a critical role in providing valuable primary and secondary insights 
about the intent of Wanda’s Western cinema acquisitions. In the second study, I induct intent 
by using corporate financial data. Quantitative financial data aims to provide further rigor to 
the theoretical concepts expounded in the first study by validating the performance of key 
strategic initiatives at the operational level. In the third study, I further induct intent from film 
and box-office data. Film and box-office data provides further validation on the results from 
the first and second studies. Where possible, I collected data for the inductive studies from 
separate sources so as to avoid common methods bias. 
Inductive analysis allows for a systematic approach to new concept development and 
grounded theory articulation by bringing qualitative rigor and transparency to inductive 
research (Fischer, 1982). By opting for an inductive approach, the propositions can be more 
grounded, accurate and general (Yin, 2003). The diversity of the data sources creates a rich 
combination of data with which to explore and triangulate the propositions. 
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4.4 STUDY 1 
4.4.1 Data Collection 
The extensive qualitative data source includes interviews, pertinent statements, 
reports, speeches, news items, scholarly articles, and press releases in relation to Wanda’s 
Western cinema acquisitions. Selection of the qualitative data is based on two criteria. First, 
the commentary must be made by a senior executive of Wanda, AMC or Hoyts. 
Alternatively, commentary may also come from a senior Chinese Government official. 
Second, the qualitative commentary must relate to Wanda, AMC or Hoyts. The qualitative 
data is collected from a variety of sources. Ostensibly, Wang’s book, The Wanda Way (2016), 
provides extensive scholarly insight and includes 12 interviews and speeches given by Wang. 
Given that strategic intent is driven from the top (O’Shannassy, 2016; Rui and Yip, 2008), 
heavy emphasis is given to statements made by Wang. In addition, press releases and annual 
reports of Wanda, Hoyts and AMC provide further narrative to the qualitative data. Other 
qualitative data is identified by conducting Google searches with search terms which meet the 
selection criteria. The qualitative data ranges from 2010 to 2017. This captures all of 
Wanda’s Western cinema acquisitions from 2012 to 2017. The two additional years between 
2010 to 2012 provide for policy and strategy changes and implementation at the corporate 
level, which reflects Wanda’s decision to start acquiring Western cinema assets in 2012.  
I employ thematic analysis to identify common themes evident in the qualitative data. 
All qualitative data is transcribed, coded, and analyzed using NVivo. NVivo allows for the 
classifying, sorting, arranging, and exploring non-numerical and unstructured data (Crowley 
et al., 2002; Bazeley and Jackson, 2007). I coded for both business and financial intent as 
well as for political intent. There were 3 sub-categories for business and financial intent and 2 
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sub-categories within political intent. Various quotes that address the coded categories were 
assigned from the qualitative data. 
Out of 474 pages of text, the qualitative data-set contains over 226 literal quotes, of 
which around 80% are from Wanda’s founder, 10% are by Wanda’s key management 
personnel, 5% are by government officials, and 5% are from expert commentators. The intent 
of documents which form the qualitative data are also unique and varied: Around 17% are 
designed to provide an update on Wanda’s activities, 13% are information for the general 
public, 27% are about Wang’s management philosophy, 30% are interviews, and 13% are on 
government policy and policy implementation. This unique set of qualitative data provides a 
rich narrative to explain and support Wanda’s strategic-intent for its Western acquisitions.  
4.4.2 Results 
Chinese Government Intervention in Wanda’s Foreign Acquisitions 
The State is a significant factor in understanding foreign acquisition activities by 
Wanda. The qualitative data shows a close relationship between corporate China and the 
Chinese Government. During a speech at Harvard University, Wang commented that,  
“Government-business relations are very complicated in China… It’s difficult to 
develop a successful private company of scale in China…The Chinese economy and 
the Asian economies in general are dominated by the government, and no one can 
work around government-business relations.” 
This relationship can often be complex. The difficulty lies in reconciling the firm’s 
own financial aspirations with the political objectives of the Government. On the one hand, 
the Chinese Government provides strategic support to firms undertaking foreign acquisition. 
Government support typically includes subsidies, loans, tax rebates, and investment 
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insurance. This support offsets some of the inherent competitive disadvantages of Chinese 
firms. On the other hand, the Chinese Government also provides political guidance in the 
strategic direction of China’s largest corporations. This includes using private businesses to 
achieve a political outcome.  
Wanda recognizes the importance of the Chinese Government in supporting the firm’s 
business, financial and strategic aspirations. Speaking at Tsinghua University, Wang said 
“…the Government dominates everything and makes the most crucial decisions. If a 
businessman detaches himself completely from the Government, I think that’s not right.” The 
challenge that Chinese conglomerates face is properly reconciling the balance between 
business and politics or in Wang’s words “stay[ing] close to the Government but away from 
politics.” 
Chinese policy-makers have long acknowledged Western foreign acquisitions as a 
precondition for Chinese firms to effectively compete in the global market. Since October of 
2000, the Chinese Government has actively encouraged Wanda to undertake foreign 
acquisitions as part of its “Go Global” strategy. In an interview with the South China 
Morning Post, Wang said that,  
“Private companies that go global to expand their business are answering the call 
from Government. At the end of last year, China’s State Council specifically released 
specifications to guide private companies going global. It can be said that Wanda 
answered that call.” 
 Specifically, this strategy focuses on encouraging domestic firms to acquire 
investments in research and development and other areas of advanced technologies to support 
domestic innovation. In a circular published in October of 2004, the Ministry of Commerce 
expressly encouraged firms to invest in overseas research and development centers to, “utilize 
  
91 
 
internationally advanced technologies, managerial skills and professionals.” Such 
encouragement is aimed at the Government’s efforts to accelerate China’s domestic 
innovation capabilities by effectively leveraging foreign resources, knowledge, and expertise.  
The results also reveal that private firms are highly susceptible to changes in 
government policy. In particular, large, privately-owned conglomerates can be the focus of 
targeted government action. Two recent Government policy changes have affected Wanda’s 
business and financial intent aspirations. First, on 16 July 2017, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission instructed all domestic banks to cease financing several of Wanda’s 
Western acquisitions in the entertainment sector. The inability to recapitalize debt has put a 
number of Wanda’s future films in jeopardy. Second, the restrictions on capital outflow from 
China have resulted in difficulties relating to the transfer of funds abroad to meet the firm’s 
financial commitments. This inability to transfer capital has resulted in the firm being unable 
to settle its acquisition of Dick Clarke Productions, worth over $1 billion.  
The active support and intervention by the Chinese Government in supervising 
Wanda’s Western acquisitions evinces political intent to use corporate China to achieve 
specific political objectives; thus, Proposition 1 cannot be rejected. 
Spreading China’s Soft Power 
The qualitative data also shows that the exhibition of Chinese films to Western 
audiences may indicate China’s desire to spread soft power. This can be inferred, 1) from the 
active support by the Chinese Government in encouraging Wanda to establish channels in the 
West by granting Chinese film producers greater access to Western consumers, and 2) from 
the increasing number of Chinese films exhibited in Western cinemas.  
Wanda views its foreign acquisitions as a vehicle to push positive Chinese narratives 
globally. In a speech to the China Business Leaders Forum, Wang noted that “…news about 
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China are usually negative in foreign media. And where do people get information and 
knowledge? The media…That’s why we want to establish a channel for the world to 
understand China.” 
The need to improve China’s global image has been a growing concern for the 
Chinese Government. The cultural industry is a pillar industry according to China’s Five-
Year Plan, which means that the Chinese Government actively supports the expansion of 
Chinese cultural industries abroad. John Zhang, a Professor of Marketing at the Wharton 
School and Director of the Penn Wharton China Center, notes that there is a “concerted effort 
in China to move into the global entertainment and media industry to build China’s soft 
power… Aside from being good business, it is a way to protect China’s influence in the 
world.” At the macro level, cultural industries in China have received significant focus 
following the publication of the Government’s Cultural Industries Stimulation Plan (the 
“Plan”) (2009). In particular, the Plan has provided Chinese firms operating in the cultural 
industries with strong political support to undertake foreign acquisitions with a particular 
focus on the film industry. In 2010, the state council, together with nine other Government 
ministries, released guidelines related to how the Government can support firms undertaking 
foreign acquisition activities in the film industry.  
Wanda views the Chinese Government as the leading force setting China’s 
international cultural policy, while corporate China is responsible for executing the 
Government’s plans. Wang has previously said that, “we must rely on private enterprise for 
culture to go out.” Wanda supports this policy by acting as the “main force to promote 
Chinese culture.” 
Wanda promotes Chinese culture for two reasons: First, as a private enterprise, it is 
easier to get foreign investment approvals both in China and abroad. Wang has previously 
  
93 
 
said that, “we acquired the British European cinema that went through more than 20 
countries for approval, and we have received formal approval last week. If a [Chinese] state-
owned enterprise went for this task, it may not be approved.” Likewise, Wang has also noted 
that, in the case of their acquisition of AMC, “we [Wanda] got approvals from the 
Department of Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security within one month, half a 
month earlier than approvals from the Chinese Government.” Second, foreign investments 
made by private enterprises cause less resentment and greater enlightenment than acquisitions 
made by state-owned enterprises (“SOE”). Wang noted that, in the West,  
“abrupt propaganda will not work. Private enterprises take their own money to do it, 
and they want profitable revenues, so they would work hard to achieve others’ 
approvals and purchases. It may be easier for us to find a balance between the 
cultural greatness and the market, so that we can make Chinese culture become 
Chinese national treasure and more acceptable to foreigners.” 
The qualitative data also shows that the main way Wanda promotes Chinese culture is 
through mandating the number of Chinese films exhibited in its Western cinema assets. Since 
Wanda’s acquisitions of AMC and Hoyts, the number of Chinese films shown in these 
cinemas has steadily increased. Speaking about the rise of Chinese films at the Shanghai 
Cultural Industry Development Lecture Course, Wang noted that, 
“I require them [AMC] to screen at least five Chinese films annually. I’ll give you 
some data: in 2012 we merged with AMC, and in that year we released eight Chinese 
films. In 2013, we released 13 Chinese films. This created a history of China in the 
United States. One year before this, just screening one Chinese movie was not bad, 
and that basically was not market-orientated.” 
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 The increase in the number of Chinese films exhibited in Western cinemas may 
suggest political intent given that Chinese films have not traditionally performed well 
financially outside China. In Wang’s own words: In the past, “the state invested money to 
contract several [Western] cinemas to screen one movie twice, and at once it was returned.” 
The move towards more “marked-orientated” Chinese films may indicate business and 
financial intent. However, I suggest that the market-orientation of the Chinese film market 
enables it to be sustainable in the long-term. Therefore, market-orientation may still suggest 
political intent. Consequently, Proposition 1 may nonetheless be supported. 
Acquiring Firm-Specific Resources 
The qualitative data shows that Wanda needs to acquire firm-specific resources to 
quickly scale up its business and overcome inherent competitive disadvantages. Firm-specific 
resources refer to those specialized assets and capabilities which have been developed over 
time and are proprietary, difficult to imitate, trade, and acquire in the open market. 
Foreign acquisitions allow Wanda to quickly increase its size and market power. Gordon Orr, 
a Senior Advisor to McKinsey China, notes that, 
“Chinese business leaders recognize that many elements of the entertainment 
business are fully global and if they are to maximize their revenues they need to be 
able to seamlessly access global markets. Making international acquisitions can 
accelerate their ability to do so.” 
Wang has said that “it’s virtually impossible to scale up a business by relying on 
organic growth alone. None of the Fortune 500 companies managed to grow to the size that 
they have today without M&A.” As such, Wanda’s foreign acquisitions are used as a way to 
grow and expand the business globally. During the AMC acquisition ceremony, Wang 
commented as follows: “we have grown more than 40% over the last five years…Because our 
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growth is taking place so fast, we have developed global strategic goals, in addition to the 
development in China. The acquisition of AMC became our first step of globalization.” This 
globalization strategy allows Wanda to acquire a stronger market position; accelerate the 
process of entering foreign markets; acquire established purchase, distribution and sales 
networks; and move up the value chain.  
Foreign acquisitions also allow Wanda to overcome competitive disadvantages by 
acquiring firm-specific resources to increase its global competitiveness. Wanda recognizes 
that, for it to be globally competitive, it needs more than mere economies of scale, as scale 
advantage is reflective of a countrywide factor that is evident in all firms of the size. Gordon 
Orr notes that, “many Chinese entertainment companies have a lot of capital; they may feel 
short of opportunities to deploy this capital in China and see easier opportunities to do so 
internationally.” Wanda seeks to acquire firm-specific resources in three ways:  
First, Wanda seeks to improve its firm-specific advantages through collaboration with 
foreign firms. This is evident in Wanda’s partnership with Sony to cooperate on multiple big-
budget films. In a statement, Wanda said that, “The alliance will help strengthen Wanda's 
power to influence the global film industry, and set a good precedent for Chinese film 
producers in their international investment.” In addition, Jack Gao, Wanda's Head of 
International Investment and Operations, said “Wanda would continue to seek alliances with 
other content companies and closer relationships with leading media firms.” These 
collaborative initiatives provide significant technology and capability-transfer benefits to 
Wanda. However, collaboration with foreign firms may also induce reliance on the foreign 
partner for technology and capabilities rather than lead to the development of Wanda’s own 
specialized resources. 
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Second, open-market competition with both domestic and foreign firms incentivizes 
Wanda to actively engage in seeking out firm-specific resources in order to survive and grow 
in its domestic market. The open market also provides impetus to grow outside the domestic 
market where there are opportunities for strategic growth in other established markets. 
Third, Wanda acquires firm-specific advantages via foreign acquisition in Western 
markets. Through these acquisitions, Wanda can quickly and efficiently acquire expertise in 
the form of managerial know-how, assets, market share, technology, and established business 
networks in an established market.  
I note that, while firm-specific resources may be captured through collaboration, 
competition, and acquisitions, dissemination of this knowledge within the broader firm 
requires substantial time as part of the post-acquisition integration process. However, 
Wanda’s investment approach is one that reflects a long-term view on growing its 
capabilities. Wang has previously said that “…like some of our overseas cultural industry 
investment, we also need to be patient for China’s film industry to develop. Private 
enterprises have longer boss tenure, so the CEO will usually consider a more long-term 
strategy.” In addition, speaking on the AMC acquisition, Wang commented that, “…the point 
in which we are different from the previous AMC shareholders is that, after we bought AMC, 
we will never sell it.” I find that Wanda’s strategic decision-making is geared towards this 
long-term outlook. This long-term outlook in Wanda’s investment is shared by Gerry Lopez, 
CEO of AMC: “[Wanda is comprised of] long-term folks [who] don’t run their business on a 
week-in, week-out or quarter-in and quarter-out basis. They are investing for the long-term.” 
Similarly, Damian Keogh, CEO of Hoyts, remarked further: “The Chinese business mentality 
has this 100 year philosophy on what they're doing and where they're going. I met with him 
[Wang] the morning after the Chinese stock market crash and had lunch that day; he was 
showing no signs of concern. He doesn't have a short-term view, everything is long-term.” 
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This long-term investment outlook supports business and financial intent in establishing and 
building its capabilities and networks to develop into a global conglomerate. This tends to 
support the premise expounded in Proposition 2. 
Building Global Competitive Advantage 
The qualitative data show that firm-specific resources allow Wanda to build its global 
competitive advantage. The acquisition of firm-specific resources builds the firm’s capability 
to innovate, change, and modernize. In a speech to Huashang College, Wang said “we need to 
create stronger competitive advantage, with higher entry barriers and specialization…a 
business that requires creativity and special talent.” This need to acquire firm-specific 
resources is driven by strong domestic competition. Wanda’s foreign acquisitions allow the 
firm to address two resource disadvantages: first, its access to advanced technology and 
second, management expertise.  
The acquisition of technology through the cross sharing of intellectual property is a 
primary motivation for Wanda’s Western acquisitions. Damian Keogh commented to 
reporters on Wanda’s apparent open flow of information between its different business units 
and firms, noting: 
“Wanda has 200 cinema complexes in China at the moment. By 2020 they'll have 
1000. We had some very good meetings with AMC, Wanda and Hoyts about a lot of 
shared intellectual property; how we run our cinema businesses, and a really strong 
focus on customers and how we communicate. We have a loyalty program at Hoyts of 
about half a million customers so there's a lot of focus on how we communicate 
directly with them and particularly through mobile.” 
The need for technological acquisition and expertise is driven by Wanda’s motivation 
to move their film-and-cinema business from the cheap to the sophisticated. Wanda seeks to 
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build up the supply chain for bringing films to market. This is done through two 
complementary strategies. First, Wanda strives to increase the appeal of Chinese films to an 
international audience. This is achieved by putting together the domestic infrastructure 
needed to enable an increase in film production and quality and by acquiring well-known 
international studios to extract technology distribution networks and to leverage existing 
brand awareness. Second, Wanda seeks to expand its market share in cinemas. This is 
achieved both by expanding its domestic network of cinemas and by acquiring cinemas in 
established markets. This combined approach is motivated by, 1) the need for Wanda to have 
better control over cinema content, 2) the need to share intellectual property to facilitate 
accelerated market growth, and 3) the need to accelerate its international expansion into new 
markets through injection of capital. 
The acquisition of management expertise is another key component of Wanda’s 
broader market-competitiveness strategy, and it forms one of Wanda’s core purposes in 
acquiring Western cinema assets. This strategy, exemplified through the sale of secondary 
film-related products, is a straightforward effort to raise margins by diversifying out of the 
lower-margin enterprises into higher-margin enterprises. This is done by sharing knowledge 
and expertise in the acquired assets and by observing the operations of acquired assets. One 
example of this strategy is Wanda’s aspiration to increase its secondary cinema revenue not 
associated with ticket sales. In an interview with the Australian Financial Review, Damian 
Keogh noted that “China has this massive growth in cinemas but they make about 80¢ per 
customer in the candy bar whereas we're close to $5…They look at us and say, 'What can you 
teach us? How can we learn from you?'”  
I further observe that Wanda places a high value on innovation through its acquisition 
of firm-specific resources. Innovation allows Wanda to gain a competitive edge against 
competitors and provides “pricing power derived from the fact that they [Wanda] have 
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something that others don’t, which allows them to yield more profits than the competitors.” In 
a speech to Tsinghua University, Wang commented as follows: 
“There are 130 cinema chains in China, and Wanda’s screens account for less than 
7% of the national total, but we generate 15% of the total revenue created by all 
Chinese cinemas combined. Each of our screens yields more than twice the average 
revenue and three times the average profit in the industry. These are the benefits that 
can be realized through innovative management.” 
These efforts by Wanda to build its competitive advantage by developing capabilities 
in technology and management evinces a strategic narrative built on business and financial 
intent, supporting Proposition 2. 
Competing by Collaboration 
Wanda’s foreign acquisition activities are aimed at supporting growth and improving 
competitive advantage in both the domestic Chinese market and in Western markets. To 
achieve this, collaboration between different areas of the firm form an important part of its 
long-term growth strategy. In a speech at the China Green Companies Summit, Wang noted 
that, 
“Wanda currently has operations in commercial property, cultural tourism, finance 
and departmental stores. Whether Wanda employs asset-light or asset-heavy methods 
of development, these four industries support and complement one another. 
Previously, Wanda developed cinemas, electronic game arcades and discount KTV 
(karaoke systems) in order to provide mall customers with a vibrant experience, and 
this required substantial support from cultural and entertainment fields.” 
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I observe that collaboration forms a vital part of Wanda’s broader strategic plan in 
three ways.  
First, through Wanda’s foreign acquisitions, the firm promotes the sharing of 
resources, intellectual property, technology, and expertise across all of its divisions and 
subsidiaries, thereby allowing the whole firm to benefit from advancements made in one area 
of the business. This collaborative sharing of resources can be witnessed in Wanda’s 
approach to entering new markets. Wang has noted that, “the reason for buying [AMC] is to 
develop it, to support it, to do better. [Therefore] we also promised to invest $500 million 
over the next three years to upgrade a rather large number of AMC theatres”. 
Second, Wanda’s foreign acquisitions also allow the firm to diversify both its 
investment choices and its investment locations. When asked by a reporter from the Financial 
Times what attracted Wanda to acquire AMC, Wang responded that “You don’t put all the 
eggs in one basket.” 
Third, in relation to the film-and-cinema business, collaboration and vertical 
integration allow Wanda to gain a competitive advantage against traditional Hollywood 
studios, which are prohibited from owning cinemas by anti-trust law.  
The ability for Wanda to own the entire value chain gives the firm a clear competitive edge 
over rival competitors due to regulatory constraints. The fact that Wanda owns both the 
largest cinema network in the world and one of the leading Hollywood studios allows it to 
have a competitive advantage over both existing Hollywood studios and other major Western 
cinema chains. Wanda’s current investments in the cinema industry allow it to ensure that its 
own films are given the most prominence and longest screen time over competitor films. The 
firm has also said it wants to control 20% of global box-office ticket sales by 2020. 
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 These collaborative initiatives to build up the capability of the broader Wanda group 
evinces business and financial intent in the firm’s Western cinema acquisitions, which is 
suggestive of Proposition 2. 
4.5 STUDY 2 
4.5.1 Data Collection 
In addition to the qualitative data used in Study 1, I also collect quantitative financial 
data for AMC, Hoyts and Wanda through their corporate annual reports. Given that Hoyts is 
not a publicly listed firm, I have collected its financial performance data from Wanda’s 
consolidated financial statements. The data encompasses financial results from 2009 to 2016 
for AMC and from 2011 to 2016 for Wanda and Hoyts, thereby covering both pre and post-
acquisition periods. The financial data includes 1) data directly collected from annual reports: 
revenue, profit, net income, cash from operations, total assets and equity, and 2) financial 
ratios computed using annual report data: return on asset, return on equity, profit margin, and 
cash-flow margin. 
The financial results provide a base to explore the propositions and allow for pre and 
post-acquisition comparison using t-test. They provide a clear picture of the financial 
performance of these strategic assets both prior to and after acquisition. This allows for 
patterns of financial performance to be observed in Wanda’s foreign acquisitions and helps us 
determine whether theoretical narratives expounded in the qualitative data reflect the real-
world operating environment. I recognize that external factors may impact on the firm’s 
financial performance thus affecting the financial data. However, given the aims of this 
article is not hypothesis testing but rather proposition exploration, the absence of external 
factors in these financial results does not detract from the empirical relevance and soundness 
of the financial results. Strong financial performance after the acquisition may suggest that 
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acquisitions are made for business and financial intent, whereas consistently weak financial 
results post-acquisition may indicate the absence of business and financial intent. 
4.5.2 Results 
Prima facie, the financial data does not suggest political intent. This is because both 
acquirees’ overall post-acquisition financial performance has improved significantly. These 
financial results support the firm’s broader foreign investment strategy and suggest that its 
priority is to make a profit and create value for shareholders. Comparison of the pre and post-
acquisition annual financial results of AMC and Hoyts show substantial improvements in 
financial performance across most indicators. I suggest that these performance improvements 
are a direct result of Wanda’s foreign investment approach, which involves identifying and 
acquiring loose-brick assets within established Western cinema markets. 
AMC 
AMC’s financial performance has seen substantial improvements since Wanda’s 
acquisition in 2012. Table 4.3 shows the firm’s pre and post-acquisition financial indicators 
between 2009 and 2016. 
Table 4.3: Pre-acquisition vs. Post-acquisition Financials for AMC (million USD except 
ratios) 
 Pre-acq Post-acq 
Difference t- test 
average average 
Total revenue 2,353.1 2,906.9 553.8 0.014** 
Gross Profit 349.6 532.8 183.2 0.009*** 
Net income -81.1 161.0 242.1 0.07* 
Cash from Ops. 116.7 388.5 271.8 0.013** 
Total assets 3,801.9 5,885.2 2,083.2 0.114 
Total equity 361.3 1,642.1 1,280.8 0.000*** 
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ROA -0.023 0.027 0.050 0.012** 
ROE -0.222 0.123 0.345 0.049** 
Profit margin -0.035 0.056 0.091 0.078* 
Cash flow Margin 0.049 0.133 0.084 0.081* 
 ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
AMC’s post-acquisition results reveal that its total revenue has grown over 21%, 
gross profits over 33%, net income over 104%, and profit margins over 75%. The t-test also 
revealed a 5% significance for return on equity and return of assets and 10% significance for 
profit and cash flow margins. Similar performance improvements were also evident in 
AMC’s cash from operations, total assets, and total equity. 
Hoyts 
Hoyts was acquired by Wanda in 2015. The financial results in Table 4.4 focus on 
Hoyts’ financial performance during the period from 2011 to 2016. 
Table 4.4: Pre-acquisition vs. Post-acquisition Financials for Hoyts (million AUD except 
ratios) 
 Pre-acq Post-acq 
Difference t- test 
average average 
Total Revenue 355.3 421.9 66.63 0.118 
Net Income 1.0 38.2 37.2 0.003*** 
Total Assets 608.0 984.7 376.7 0.749 
Total Equity 64.3 354.4 290.1 0.373 
ROA 0.002 0.09 0.088 0.003*** 
ROE 0.002 0.038 0.036 0.005*** 
Profit Margin1 -0.016 0.107 0.123 0.12 
 ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
                                                 
1 Cash flow data for Hoyts is not available in Wanda’s consolidated annual reports.  
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The financial results reveal that Hoyts has also experienced significant financial 
improvement post-acquisition. Since 2015, the firm’s total revenue and net income grew by 
over 26%. The t-test also shows a significance of 1% for return on assets and return on 
equity.  
Wanda 
Wanda Cinema’s financial results are shown in Table 4.5, which covers the period 
between 2011 to 2016 and encompass its acquisition of AMC in 2012 and of Hoyts in 2015. 
Table 4.5 shows Wanda’s pre-AMC and post-AMC financial performance, while Table 4.6 
shows the firm’s pre-Hoyts and post-Hoyts financial performance. 
Table 4.5: Pre-acquisition vs. Post-acquisition Financials for Wanda (Thousands million 
CNY except ratios) 
 Pre- AMC acq Post AMC acq 
Difference t- test 
average average 
Total revenue 2,208.7 4,130.9 1,922.2 0.287 
Gross Profit 799.5 1,391.9 592.4 0.318 
Net income 305.2 597.3 292.1 0.345 
Cash from Ops. 433.6 1,063.4 629.8 0.094* 
Total assets 1,911.7 3,541.3 1,629.6 0.290 
Total equity 1,211.9 2,268.8 1,056.9 0.323 
ROA 0.160 0.166 0.006 0.730 
ROE 0.252 0.261 0.009 0.676 
Profit margin 0.138 0.143 0.005 0.789 
Cash flow Margin 0.196 0.263 0.067 0.223 
***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
The post-AMC acquisition years included in the above table are before the Hoyts 
acquisition. Whilst the post-acquisition financial performance of Wanda has improved, none 
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of the differences in financial ratios is significant. The increased financial performance in 
AMC does not affect the overall Wanda Group in the short-term. 
Table 4.6: Pre-Hoyts Acquisition vs. Post-Hoyts Acquisition Financials for Wanda 
(Thousands million CNY except ratios) 
 Pre- Hoyts acq Post Hoyts acq 
Difference t- test 
average average 
Total revenue 3,650.3 9,605.0 5,954.7 0.013** 
Gross Profit 1,243.8 3,123.7 1,879.9 0.011** 
Net income 524.3 1,276.1 751.8 0.013** 
Cash from Ops. 905.9 2,008.3 1,102.4 0.014** 
Total assets 3,133.9 17,275.2 14,141.3 0.001*** 
Total equity 2,004.6 9,753.6 7,749 0.000*** 
ROA 0.165 0.074 -0.091 0.001*** 
ROE 0.259 0.131 -0.128 0.000*** 
Profit margin 0.142 0.135 -0.007 0.597 
Cash flow Margin 0.247 0.217 -0.03 0.517 
***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The comparison between the pre-Hoyts and post-Hoyts acquisition results shows 
significant increases in the group’s raw financial indicators. These include increase of 163% 
in total revenue, 151% increase in gross profits, 143% in net income, 121% in cash from 
operations, 451% in total assets and 386% in total equity. However, ROA and ROE 
decreased significantly. This is likely due to the impact of other business segments in the 
Wanda group. Again, the result shows that the Hoyts’ financial performance does not affect 
the overall performance of the Wanda group significantly in the short-term. This is consistent 
with the view expressed in the Study 1 that the acquisition is long-term oriented.  
  
106 
 
Overall, the significant improvements in post-acquisition financial performance in 
Wanda’s acquired subsidiaries is suggestive of business and financial intent. Hence, 
Proposition 2 is supported. 
4.6 STUDY 3 
4.6.1 Data Collection 
This study utilizes film genres and box-office data to determine Wanda’s motivations. 
The exhibition of commercial genres compared with non-commercial genres may suggest 
business and financial intent. In addition, an increase in the number of Chinese films 
exhibited post-acquisition and in box-office performance further suggest business and 
financial intent. On the other hand, weak financial performance coupled with more non-
commercial genres may be indicative of political intent. The empirical relevance of the film 
results is limited to the extent of proposition exploration as it does not consider more nuanced 
and sophisticated features such as the effect of product placements and protagonists in films. 
In addition, I recognize that politically motivated films may be present in all genres and not 
just in documentary style films. However, pervious research has found that while propaganda 
and politically motivated films may be packaged in numerous ways, they are most often 
found in documentary-style productions (Bennett, 2002). 
Box-office data is collected from the Motion Picture Distributor’s Association of 
Australia for Australian results and from the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com) for 
U.S. box-office results. In locating Chinese films exhibited in both Australia and the U.S., I 
filter the results as follows: 1) films produced between 2011 to 2016, 2) country of origin is 
China, 3) film is primarily spoken in Mandarin, and 4) no joint production with Hollywood 
studios. 
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The data includes, 1) the annual number of Chinese films exhibited in Australia and 
the U.S., 2) the box-office of Chinese films exhibited in Australia and the U.S., and 3) the 
number of commercial and non-commercial genres of Chinese films exhibited in Australia 
and U.S. 
4.6.2 Results 
Genre of Chinese Films Exhibited in Australia and U.S. 
In ascertaining political intent from the film data, I examined the genre of Chinese 
films being exhibited in U.S. and Australian cinemas between 2010 to 2016. Bennett (2002) 
notes that propaganda and politically motivated films are most often found in documentary-
style productions. This is done to convince the viewer of a specific political point or to 
influence the opinions or behavior of the viewer, often by providing subjective content that 
may be deliberately misleading. As such, biographical and documentary films are coded as 
non-commercial genres. According to The Numbers, a leading online film data collection 
firm, the top five most popular film genres in the U.S. between 1995 to 2017 were adventure, 
comedy, action, drama and thriller/suspense, with a combined market share of over 86% of 
the U.S. market. As such, these genres are coded as commercial genres. Greater numbers of 
non-commercial genres shown in Western cinemas may evince political intent whereas more 
commercial genres suggest business and financial intent. Figure 4.1 illustrates the number of 
commercial vs. non-commercial genres of Chinese films exhibited in U.S. and Australian 
cinemas. 
Figure 4.1: Average Commercial and Non-Commercial Genres Exhibited in U.S. and 
Australian Cinemas 
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The results in Figure 3 show that Wanda films exhibited in U.S. and Australian 
cinemas are predominantly commercial genres. These results are consistent with the existing 
product offerings of major Hollywood studios. This tends to suggest that Wanda films are 
exhibited in the U.S. and Australian cinemas for predominantly commercial purposes. This is 
not to say that commercial genres do not have political intent. Rather, the genre of films 
exhibited in U.S. and Australian cinemas are designed primarily to cater to Western taste and 
to maximize box-office revenue.  
Number of Chinese Films Exhibited in Australia and U.S. 
The film data reveals that the number of Wanda films exhibited in AMC and Hoyts 
has gradually increased post-acquisition. Figure 4.2 illustrates the increase in the number of 
Chinese films shown in U.S. and Australian cinemas from 2011 to 2016. 
Figure 4.2: Number of Chinese Films Exhibited in U.S. and Australian Cinemas 
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Since Wanda’s acquisition of AMC, the number of Chinese films exhibited in U.S. 
cinemas has grown over 350% from nine films in 2011 to 41 films in 2016. Likewise, since 
Wanda’s acquisition of Hoyts, the number of Chinese films exhibited in Australia has 
increased over 160% from 13 films in 2014 to 34 films in 2016. Across the U.S. and 
Australia, the multi-year trend data reveals an average increase of 19.5 films per year from 
2011 to 2016. These results suggest that the general trend in both U.S. and Australian 
cinemas is of a significant increase in the number of Chinese films. 
The data further reveal an increasing acceptance of Chinese films by Western 
consumers from the box-office data. This is indicative of the growth in box-office revenue of 
Chinese films exhibited in both U.S. and Australia cinemas. Figure 4.3 below shows Chinese 
box-office revenue for the U.S. and Australian markets between 2011 to 2016.  
Figure 4.3: Total Chinese Box-Office in U.S. and Australian Cinemas 
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The box-office results suggest that Chinese films are finding greater acceptance 
within Western audiences. In the U.S., the box-office results reveal an increase of over 
1200% from 2011 to 2016. Likewise, during the same period in Australia, the box-office 
increased over 330%. The growth trajectory and pattern for box-office revenue in both the 
U.S. and Australia shows a combined average increase of over $7.2 million annually from 
2011 to 2016. The difference in the amount of box-office revenue between the U.S. and 
Australia is likely due to differences in market and population size.  
These results strongly support the presence of business and financial intent, thus, 
indicating that Proposition 2 is supported. 
4.7 DISCUSSION 
In this article, I have examined the strategic-intent of Wanda’s Western cinema 
acquisitions to determine whether these acquisitions are made for business and financial 
intent or for political intent. The results reveal a lack of evidence to support Proposition 1. 
While the qualitative data in Study 1 may suggest various political intentions, the 
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consequences of these political intentions were not evident when assessed with more 
operational data in Study 2 and Study 3.  
The results of the three studies reveal that there were 32 documents expounding 
political intent. In these documents, I found 87 quotes supporting political intent, of which 29 
deals with government intervention in foreign transactions and 58 with soft-power 
considerations. Statements of political intent have predominantly been made by Wang and 
commentators and Chinese Government officials. The main theme of documents dealing with 
political intent is the spread of China’s soft power through film; this theme is found in around 
60% of the total number of documents which discuss political intent. On the other hand, 47 
documents support business and financial matters, encompassing 139 quotes. The results 
reveal that 46 quotes deal with acquiring firm-specific advantage, 57 are about building 
competitive advantage, and 36 concerns competing by collaboration. These statements were 
mostly made by Wang and Wanda executives. The main themes of documents dealing with 
business and financial tensions were building global competitive advantage and competing by 
collaboration. Such themes can be found in over 68% of the total documents discussing 
business and financial intent.  
Though the results do not conclusively support political intent at the operational level, 
political intent may yet be influential in the forming of business and financial strategy. I 
suggest that in the case of Wanda, there exist tensions between the exercise of business and 
financial intent with balancing political intentions (see Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4: Tensions Between Political Intent and Business and Financial Intent in Informing Corporate Strategy of Private Chinese 
Enterprises 
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the interconnected nature of political intent with business and 
financial intent in forming Wanda’s overall strategic objectives. The analysis shows that, 
from the perspective of business efficacy, Wanda’s corporate strategy needs to align with 
China’s national strategy. This allows the firm to walk in tandem with the Government’s 
vision and be seen as supporting Government policy. The results suggest that Wanda’s choice 
of investment and location choices are both good business decisions and reflect the strategy 
and long-term outlook of the Chinese Government. This is further evinced by changes made 
to Wanda’s corporate strategy in adapting to changes in Government policy. I therefore 
suggest that the firm’s focus on growing its cultural business reflects the Government’s 
vision set out in the seventeenth Chinese Communist Party Conference in 2011, in which the 
Government renewed its focus to “build our country into a socialist cultural superpower”. 
The analysis further reveals that Proposition 1 is evident only in the qualitative data. 
The financial and film data cannot conclusively reveal the presence of political intent. On the 
other hand, business and financial intent is evident in all three datasets, strongly suggesting 
the presence of Proposition 2 in Wanda’s Western cinema acquisitions. This is 
understandable given that Wanda is ultimately in the business of making money and 
providing a return to its shareholders.  
While Proposition 1 is not fully supported from the financial and film data, its 
possible presence cannot be entirely dismissed. The qualitative data reveals the close 
interaction of corporate China and the Chinese Government. The lack of prima facie evidence 
to support the presence of political intent does not entirely rule out political intent in Wanda’s 
business affairs; nevertheless, political intent is not supported by the current evidence.  
Are Foreign Acquisitions by Wanda in the Film Industry Driven by Political Intent? 
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The results suggest that Wanda’s political intent is used to inform its business and 
financial intent. This does not mean that Wanda’s foreign acquisitions are motivated by 
politics, as its foreign acquisitions do not seek to achieve a specific political outcome. Rather, 
I find that Wanda’s strategic-intent is designed to support existing Chinese Government 
policy where the firm’s corporate strategy aligns with China’s national objectives.2 
Wanda is one of the first Chinese firms to make significant foreign acquisitions in the 
Western cultural sector. At the same time, the firm is rapidly developing China’s domestic 
cultural sector. This approach is highly strategic given that the cultural sector can inform and 
export the nation’s positive cultural narrative. Wanda’s foreign acquisitions allow the firm to 
control an established distribution channel through which to distribute Chinese cultural 
content globally. In fact, one of Wanda’s motivations for acquiring Western film assets is to 
tap into and existing customer base and learn to communicate directly with Western 
audiences. This allows Wanda to provide Western consumers with China’s viewpoints, 
bypassing foreign governments. At the same time, Wanda can affect technology and 
knowledge transfer to its other business units and controlled entities. This is especially 
important given that pushing unpopular content through established distribution channels will 
not result in box-office success. Therefore, the establishment of Chinese infrastructure, 
technology, network channels, and expertise on the production stage is equally important for 
Wanda. All this is aimed to grant the firm a greater ability to inform the opinions of Western 
audiences on issues from a Chinese viewpoint. Combining its global film distribution 
network with strong film production capabilities means that Chinese films can be more 
                                                 
2 In 2017, the Chinese Government clamped down on three firms (Wanda, HNA and Anbang Insurance) who 
have borrowed heavily to make foreign acquisitions in the West. This was due to concerns by the Chinese 
Government about capital outflow and the risks of Chinese firms making irrational or risky investments abroad. 
In the case of Wanda, the financing restrictions placed on the firm meant that it was unable to complete its 
acquisition of Dick Clark Productions for USD$1 billion. In an effort to further reduce debt, Wanda has also 
divested from various real estate projects in the UK and Australia as well as selling its stake in Spanish football 
club Atletico Madrid. 
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readily distributed in the West and compete effectively with Hollywood. This will allow 
Wanda to position itself as the gatekeeper for the Chinese film industry, as it has control of 
the only effective film distribution channel to Western markets. On balance, the current data 
suggests that political intent does not form a part of Wanda’s strategy for undertaking foreign 
acquisitions. Hence, Proposition 1 is not supported. However, I find that the infrastructure 
and channels being set-up to enable content distribution into the West can ultimately be used 
for a dual purpose. As such, the dissemination of political content to Western consumers in 
future cannot be ruled out. 
Are Foreign Acquisitions by Wanda in the Film Industry Driven by Business and 
Financial Intent? 
The analysis reveals that Wanda’s foreign acquisitions are predominantly motivated 
by the firm’s goals to become a global corporate leader. Wanda utilizes foreign acquisitions 
as a quick and efficient way to acquire competitive advantage. The results show that, prior to 
Wanda’s foreign acquisitions in the film industry, the firm lacked adequate advanced 
technology, a globally recognized brand, international management experience, and sales and 
distribution channels – all of which inhibited Wanda’s continued growth. As such, I find that 
Wanda uses foreign acquisitions to seek strategic, firm-specific resources with which to 
compensate for their resource and competitive disadvantages. In doing so, Wanda leverages 
its ability to access large amounts of capital to acquire specialized technology, capability, 
networks, and expertise. 
The firm sees its foreign acquisitions as a quick way to address domestic competitive 
disadvantage. Luo and Tung (2007) expound the concept of the “common push factor,” 
where firms use foreign acquisition to temper domestic competitive disadvantage. I find that 
this approach is evident in Wanda’s foreign acquisitions but is used in a more complex 
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manner. By acquiring firm-specific advantages, Wanda can gain a competitive edge over the 
local competition. At the same time, Wanda sees an opportunity to use its large capital base 
to allow its acquired assets to quickly expand in the West, which provides these assets with a 
strategic advantage within their local markets. This two-pronged approach allows Wanda to 
grow across different markets simultaneously. I further suggest that the corporate culture of 
Wanda is one which is conducive to cross sharing of resources. This is important as I find 
that, since Wanda acquired AMC and Hoyts, its Chinese cinemas have been able to 
dramatically increase their sale of secondary revenue, which is because of knowledge 
acquired from the acquired assets. 
The investment approach of Wanda is one that is independent, long-term, and 
designed to promote investor confidence and stability. Wanda takes a very hands-off 
approach in the management of acquired assets by retaining existing staff, branding, 
management and firm structure. To the uninitiated observer, these acquired assets will appear 
to be business as usual. Any changes introduced by Wanda through the acquired assets are 
often subtle and discreet. For example, these changes can include a gradual increase in the 
number of Chinese films shown in these cinemas or the introduction of better quality seating 
or overall venue experience. Wanda can effectively incorporate existing networks and 
distribution channels from its foreign acquisitions into its broader operations. The results 
show that, through close collaboration between its different business units and firms, Wanda 
can overcome institutional constraints by mobilizing and integrating the firm’s technological 
and knowledge capacity. I also see that strong institutional incentives, reflected through 
Government support for foreign investment activities, provide confidence and affirm the 
firm’s strategic vision. As such, Proposition 2 is supported.  
I present one of the first firm-level studies examining alternative intent theories for 
the internationalization strategy of firms from emerging economies. This inductive mix 
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methods article reveals that, while Western acquisitions made by private Chinese firms are 
primarily based on business efficacy, political intent cannot be entirely ruled out. I find that 
the distinction between business and politics is less distinct and separate compared with that 
of Western firms. I also note that, in navigating the complex and politically charged business 
landscape in China, Chinese firms will seek to subscribe to the Government’s political 
narrative in forming the firm’s long-term business strategy. The findings suggest that 
Wanda’s strategic-intent in acquiring Western film assets makes both good business sense 
and good political sense. I therefore posit that foreign acquisitions made by Chinese firms are 
first and foremost based on business and financial intent, which is informed by the prevailing 
political environment.  
4.8 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
The internationalization of Chinese firms is not new. Various studies have examined 
this phenomenon, focusing on SOE (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; and Deng, 2004). This 
article sheds new light on this subject in two distinct ways. First, I examined China’s 
expanding cultural enterprise: a growing and unique industry which has so far received 
limited attention. Second, I examined this phenomenon from the lens of Wanda, a leading 
private Chinese enterprise. 
This study contributes to existing ownership-to-performance theories and strategy-
process and strategy-practice research. I provide new knowledge and deeper insight into the 
strategic-intent of private Chinese enterprises undertaking foreign acquisitions in the West. I 
identify both business and financial intent together with political intent and their inherent 
interdependencies. The research propositions developed here connect strategic-intent and 
corporate governance practices with political intent – an under-researched area of some 
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relevance to the strategic behavior of Chinese firms and to the broader strategic management 
scholarship. 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
This article has analyzed the strategic-intent of Wanda’s foreign acquisitions in the 
context of its cinema business. It provides a basis for understanding the intent of foreign 
acquisitions made by Chinese firms in Western film. The three studies support the premise 
that business and financial intent forms the primary strategic-intent consideration. However, 
any intent based purely on business efficacy is mediated by Chinese Government policy. 
These priorities differ significantly from the foreign acquisition motivations of SOEs whose 
priorities are political rather than business or financial. These behaviors are mirrored through 
existing studies which consider strategic behavior, as in Aulakh and Kotabe (1997), Kim and 
Hwang (1992), and Kogut (1988). These motivations are driven and impacted by Wanda’s 
ability to acquire, invest, and overcome any impact from changes to Chinese Government 
policy, both domestically and in the acquiring country. Given that Wanda is one of the first 
major privately owned Chinese conglomerates to make significant acquisitions in Western 
cultural industries (particularly in film), this study is limited in its scope. While the results are 
specific to Wanda, many of the issues and tensions identified between business and financial 
intent with political intent are applicable more broadly. It is envisaged that, with more private 
Chinese enterprises undertaking acquisitions in Western cultural industries, the results of this 
study may be substantiated and further strengthened.  
  
  
119 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The focus of the previous chapters has been on exploring the relationship between 
ownership and innovation performance within the setting of the global creative industry. In 
each of the articles, I have explored a different dimension of ownership and its relationship 
with performance outcomes. Much attention has been paid in this thesis to different forms of 
ownership (such as content ownership, ownership of the value chain, and strategic 
ownership) within different sectors of the creative industry (such as in the film industry and 
virtual-worlds). This Chapter seeks to synthesize the findings of the five studies contained in 
this thesis. First, I summaries the major findings. Second, I discuss the implications of the 
findings for the main theoretical themes given. Third, I discuss implications for practice, 
particularly for managers and organizations operating within the creative industry. Finally, 
this thesis offers suggestions for future research.  
5.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
The findings generally show that within the context of the creative industry, 
ownership has a positive effect on performance. Chapter 2 focused on how ownership affects 
user-innovation and entrepreneurship within the virtual-world environment. This study 
showed that virtual-worlds have become an arena for user-generated innovation enabling a 
new wave of entrepreneurs to extract real-world value from virtual property. The study 
conceptualized virtual-world ownership into two layers: 1) the content, and 2) the virtual 
platform. I used in-depth case-studies of ownership related disputes from virtual-world user-
innovators to understand the role of ownership ambiguity in relation to success in a virtual-
environment. The findings of this study revealed that the separation of content and platform 
ownership and their inherent interdependencies are a source of ownership tensions posing 
significant challenges to virtual-world entrepreneurs. In addition, the virtual-world business 
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model favors the platform’s ownership rights while undermining other kinds of competing 
ownership interests (such as those of the content owner). The findings show that the current 
business structures of virtual-worlds around ownership rights and control appears to be 
detrimental for successful business creation, profitable technology development and long-
term user-innovation success. Through this study, I showed how competing and unresolved 
ownership tensions can have a negative effect on innovation performance. 
Chapter 3 focused on how ownership of the value chain affects box-office 
performance of films. This study examined the performance outcomes for bringing motion-
pictures to market from integration of the supply chain through ownership. A cross sectional 
study using multiple regression analysis was employed comprising data of matched film 
samples produced by both integrated and non-integrated value chains to better understand the 
performance implications of ownership on content performance at the box-office. The results 
of this study indicate that vertical integration does have a positive effect on box-office 
performance. I find that Hollywood films invariably exhibit superior performance at the box-
office due to its dominance over the global film market. However, the analysis indicates that 
comparable films produced through vertical integration significantly mitigates Hollywood’s 
dominance during the first week post release and in later week cycles of the film’s exhibition 
life cycle. These are the most critical periods for predicting a film’s overall financial success. 
These results are both statistically and economically significant. While this study shows that 
performance improvements are less significant during the middle of a film’s exhibition life 
cycle, this period is not a major indicator of a film’s overall success. 
Chapter 4 focused on the strategic-intent of Chinese acquisitions in the Western 
cinema industry. In particular, the studies focused on the Chinese conglomerate Dalian 
Wanda’s recent acquisitions in the Western film industry (notably in Australia, Europe and 
North America). This Chapter sought to explore alternative intent theories and explore 
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propositions based primarily on business and financial and political intent motivations in 
Wanda’s takeover behavior. I employed in-depth inductive analysis through three unique 
studies to triangulate key motivators for Wanda’s foreign acquisition behavior. The findings 
of this Chapter revealed that business and financial intent indeed forms the primary strategic-
intent consideration influencing Wanda’s intent motivations. However, the article also shows 
that for private Chinese firms such as Wanda, any strategic-intent objectives based purely on 
business efficacy must be mediated by domestic Government policy to a greater extent than 
their Western counterpart due to the Chinese Government’s tight market control. 
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MAIN THEORETICAL THEMES 
A major theme of this thesis is the determination of how and in what way ownership 
affects performance outcomes for both firms and entrepreneurs. Previous literature has shown 
mixed results in terms the performance benefits achieved through ownership (Baker et al., 
2002; Bergström, 1999; Eisenberg, 1999; Crabb, 2005). Existing literature has argued that 
such divergence in results is due to two factors. First, the ownership-to-performance 
relationship is dependent on the industry effect (Hu and Izumida, 2008). Second, the way that 
ownership-to-performance is measured may also impact on the result (Isaksen et al., 2011). 
As such, this thesis took a multi-faceted approach in understanding this question by exploring 
this issue from different perspectives and using different methodologies and estimation 
techniques within the context of the broader creative industry.  
Through the five studies presented as part of this thesis, I generally find that 
ownership has a significant impact on performance within the creative industry. In Chapter 2, 
I find that competing ownership tensions negatively affect user-innovation success. In 
Chapter 3, I find that ownership of the value chain for film production mediates the dominant 
performance of Hollywood films at the box-office. And in Chapter 4, the findings show that 
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private firms from China improve their financial performance when they seek out strategic 
assets in the Western cultural industry.  
The results of this thesis suggest that the relationship between ownership and 
performance are dependent on several factors. First, the governance environment (such as 
communities, political environments, cultures and ideologies, industry organization, financial 
markets and laws) in which the firm operates. Second, how ownership structure is measured. 
And third, how performance is measured. 
A second theme of this thesis is the contribution to the digital and virtual 
entrepreneurship theories. Chapter 2 built a comprehensive ownership tension framework to 
study success of user-innovators with the virtual-environment. The results identify the 
ownership tensions and the resulting power play in favor of the platform. I find that the 
uneven playing field between the platform and content owners results in significant 
inhibitions on long-term and sustainable user-innovation success. This study represents the 
first-time ownership and user-innovation performance in the virtual-world have been 
identified and explored in detail. 
A third theme of this thesis is the contribution to strategy-process and strategy-
practice research. Chapter 4 of this thesis provides new knowledge and deeper insight into the 
strategic-intent of private Chinese enterprises undertaking foreign acquisitions in the West. I 
identify both business and financial intent together with political intent and their inherent 
interdependencies. The research propositions developed here connect strategic-intent and 
corporate governance practices with political intent, an under researched area of some 
relevance to the strategic behavior of Chinese firms and to the broader strategic management 
scholarship. 
5.3 IMPLICATION FOR PRACTICE 
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The results of this thesis have several implications for managers, firms and 
entrepreneurs. Overall, this thesis aims to assist managers in the creative industry make better 
decisions around ownership structure: such as identifying ownership tensions, knowing 
whether to vertically integrate and whether to acquire foreign assets. While this thesis is 
focused on the creative industry, many of the practical implications are applicable to 
managers, firms and entrepreneurs from other comparable industries.  
First, in Chapter 2, the limitations to user-innovation using the current ownership 
structure of virtual-worlds may assist platforms with designing and implementing a more 
liberal governance structure which eliminates or at least reduces the tensions between user-
innovators and the platform. The findings suggest that regulation needs to be created at a 
higher, more universal level that enshrines and protects user rights from broad interference by 
the platform. I posit that the protection of user property rights in the legal system will 
potentially level the playing field and address key tensions around the power imbalance 
between the users and platform. 
Second, Chapter 3 has practical implications for rival film industries or studios that 
wish to compete with Hollywood. The fact that vertical integration has been shown to impact 
critical periods of the film life cycle indicates that replication of this strategy may benefit 
smaller film studios or nations who wish to increase their market share of the global film 
market. This study shows that vertical integration may be an effective long-term strategy to 
improve firm performance where 1) the market is risky and unstable; 2) firms in adjacent 
stages of the industry value chain have greater market power; 3) Integration would create or 
exploit market power by raising barriers to entry or allowing price discrimination across 
customer segments; and 4) where it’s a new market, firms need to forward integrate in order 
to develop the new market value chain for bring products to market. I further posit that 
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vertical integration may be used as a strategy to seize opportunities and extend existing 
capabilities in order to cope with a competitive business environment. 
Third, Chapter 4 provides implications for creative industry firms from emerging 
economies who may wish to undertake foreign acquisition as a way of accelerated growth. 
This article shows that Wanda’s acquisitions in the Western cinema and film markets have 
yielded significant performance benefits for the firm and allowed it to effectively compete 
with local competition by gaining a competitive advantage through the acquisition of firm-
specific resources. The results of this study provide practical implications for both firms 
wishing to operate inside China and Chinese firms seeking to undertake foreign acquisitions 
in Western economies. I posit that in China, the distinction between business and politics is 
less distinct and separate compared with Western nations. I note that in navigating the 
complex and politically charged business landscape in China, Chinese firms will seek to 
subscribe to the Government’s political narrative in forming its long-term business strategy. 
5.4 FURTHER RESEARCH 
While much is already known about the relationship between ownership and 
performance, there are still areas that require further research. Through this thesis, I believe 
three areas require further study and understanding. 
First, in Chapter 2, I measure ownership to innovation performance within the virtual-
world by using legal forms of protection. Not all entrepreneurs and firms protect their assets 
and innovation performance through legal means. Some may prefer to keep their expertise as 
trade secrets or implement mechanisms for protecting innovations. It is yet unclear what 
mechanisms most effectively translate virtual-world user-innovation into wealth creation, 
other underlying factors may function as a critical linkage between user-innovation and value 
realization. Future research may therefore need to explore why user-innovators with 
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outstanding innovation performance within the virtual-world fail to increase their wealth in a 
timely manner.  
In addition, the study only identifies the specific tensions evident between the 
platform and user-innovators. Further research may be done in developing a governance 
structure which eliminates or reduces these tensions. 
Second, in Chapter 3, I briefly touched on the growth of new mediums such as 
Netflix, Hulu and other online streaming services which are competing directly with 
Hollywood. These new online streaming services are often integrated. Future research could 
explore whether similar performance benefits exist in the ownership structure of online 
streaming services compared with Hollywood studios.  
In addition, this study found that the performance of films at the box-office forms 
only a portion of the total cost benefit analysis associated with vertical integration. The 
market-mitigating mechanism of vertical integration practiced by firms in the global film 
industry will invariably pose its own form of risks, set-up costs and operating costs associated 
with maintaining a vertically integrated firm structure. Future research endeavor in this light 
may work toward examining the potential risk and cost associated with vertical integration 
strategies and the performance of any secondary revenue resulting from films produced via a 
vertically integrated model to develop a more comprehensive cost-benefit framework. 
Third, Chapter 4 identified the intent motivations of Wanda’s foreign acquisitions. I 
found that Wanda’s financial performance improved post-acquisition. Given that existing 
research suggests a large proportion of mergers fail to produce their intended performance 
improvements, future research may consider Wanda’s process for selecting firms in overseas 
markets as targets for acquisition. 
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The objective of this thesis was to examine the relationship between ownership and 
performance within the creative industry. The results suggest ownership plays a significant 
role in influencing performance outcomes for firms and entrepreneurs within the creative 
industry. The findings in this thesis support and strengthen earlier studies which have found a 
positive relationship between ownership and performance.  
The results indicate that ownership significantly impact performance within the global 
creative industry. Given the diversity of empirical studies and subsequent results, additional 
research is needed to further test both the nature and consistency of the ownership-to-
performance relationship within different industries. This thesis aims to encourage other 
researchers to investigate this phenomenon further in order to create a theoretical framework 
applicable across all industries on how ownership can lead to organizational success.  
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